From a9629064d8c8b24c442f9db7fd451ede53d387b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Weiss Date: Sun, 2 Sep 2018 11:44:38 +0200 Subject: iputils: Drop unnecessary dependencies --- pkgs/os-specific/linux/iputils/default.nix | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'pkgs/os-specific/linux') diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/iputils/default.nix b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/iputils/default.nix index 557bc2f186f3..ce70cc37d690 100644 --- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/iputils/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/iputils/default.nix @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ { stdenv, fetchFromGitHub, fetchpatch , libxslt, docbook_xsl, docbook_xml_dtd_44 -, sysfsutils, openssl, libcap, libgcrypt, nettle, libidn2 +, libcap, nettle, libidn2 }: let @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { nativeBuildInputs = [ libxslt.bin ]; buildInputs = [ - sysfsutils openssl libcap libgcrypt nettle + libcap nettle ] ++ stdenv.lib.optional (!stdenv.hostPlatform.isMusl) libidn2; # ninfod probably could build on cross, but the Makefile doesn't pass --host etc to the sub configure... -- cgit 1.4.1 From 1ef5b1780fdc02e4da1c98cec4612e4fdaddca97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Weiss Date: Sun, 2 Sep 2018 12:40:46 +0200 Subject: iputils: Code refactoring and fixes - Fix the cross-compiling check and add openssl for ninfod - Add "AS-IS, SUN MICROSYSTEMS license" to meta.licenses - Install igp (see man pg3) --- pkgs/os-specific/linux/iputils/default.nix | 59 +++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) (limited to 'pkgs/os-specific/linux') diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/iputils/default.nix b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/iputils/default.nix index ce70cc37d690..e66dbe41d013 100644 --- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/iputils/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/iputils/default.nix @@ -1,12 +1,20 @@ { stdenv, fetchFromGitHub, fetchpatch , libxslt, docbook_xsl, docbook_xml_dtd_44 -, libcap, nettle, libidn2 +, libcap, nettle, libidn2, openssl }: +with stdenv.lib; + let time = "20180629"; -in -stdenv.mkDerivation rec { + # ninfod probably could build on cross, but the Makefile doesn't pass --host + # etc to the sub configure... + withNinfod = stdenv.hostPlatform == stdenv.buildPlatform; + sunAsIsLicense = { + fullName = "AS-IS, SUN MICROSYSTEMS license"; + url = "https://github.com/iputils/iputils/blob/s${time}/rdisc.c"; + }; +in stdenv.mkDerivation { name = "iputils-${time}"; src = fetchFromGitHub { @@ -17,7 +25,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { }; patches = [ - (fetchpatch { + (fetchpatch { name = "dont-hardcode-the-location-of-xsltproc.patch"; url = "https://github.com/iputils/iputils/commit/d0ff83e87ea9064d9215a18e93076b85f0f9e828.patch"; sha256 = "05wrwf0bfmax69bsgzh3b40n7rvyzw097j8z5ix0xsg0kciygjvx"; @@ -34,35 +42,36 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { ''; # Disable idn usage w/musl: https://github.com/iputils/iputils/pull/111 - makeFlags = [ "USE_GNUTLS=no" ] ++ stdenv.lib.optional stdenv.hostPlatform.isMusl "USE_IDN=no"; + makeFlags = optional stdenv.hostPlatform.isMusl "USE_IDN=no"; nativeBuildInputs = [ libxslt.bin ]; - buildInputs = [ - libcap nettle - ] ++ stdenv.lib.optional (!stdenv.hostPlatform.isMusl) libidn2; + buildInputs = [ libcap nettle ] + ++ optional (!stdenv.hostPlatform.isMusl) libidn2 + ++ optional withNinfod openssl; # TODO: Build with nettle - # ninfod probably could build on cross, but the Makefile doesn't pass --host etc to the sub configure... - buildFlags = "man all" + stdenv.lib.optionalString (stdenv.hostPlatform != stdenv.buildPlatform) " ninfod"; + buildFlags = "man all" + optionalString withNinfod " ninfod"; - installPhase = - '' - mkdir -p $out/bin - cp -p arping clockdiff ping rarpd rdisc tftpd tracepath traceroute6 $out/bin/ - if [ -x ninfod/ninfod ]; then - cp -p ninfod/ninfod $out/bin - fi + installPhase = '' + mkdir -p $out/bin + mkdir -p $out/share/man/man8 - mkdir -p $out/share/man/man8 - cd doc - cp -p \ - arping.8 clockdiff.8 ninfod.8 pg3.8 ping.8 rarpd.8 rdisc.8 tftpd.8 tracepath.8 traceroute6.8 \ - $out/share/man/man8 - ''; + for tool in arping clockdiff ping rarpd rdisc tftpd tracepath traceroute6; do + cp $tool $out/bin/ + cp doc/$tool.8 $out/share/man/man8/ + done + + # TODO: Requires kernel module pg3 + cp ipg $out/bin/ + cp doc/pg3.8 $out/share/man/man8/ + '' + optionalString withNinfod '' + cp ninfod/ninfod $out/bin/ + cp doc/ninfod.8 $out/share/man/man8/ + ''; - meta = with stdenv.lib; { + meta = { homepage = https://github.com/iputils/iputils; description = "A set of small useful utilities for Linux networking"; - license = with licenses; [ gpl2Plus bsd3 ]; # TODO: AS-IS, SUN MICROSYSTEMS license + license = with licenses; [ gpl2Plus bsd3 sunAsIsLicense ]; platforms = platforms.linux; maintainers = with maintainers; [ primeos lheckemann ]; }; -- cgit 1.4.1 From 029b9924f1b2b024e4e18750c3aec1588b7d0fbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tim Steinbach Date: Sun, 2 Sep 2018 18:56:38 -0400 Subject: linux: 4.19-rc1 -> 4.19-rc2 --- pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-testing.nix | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'pkgs/os-specific/linux') diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-testing.nix b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-testing.nix index 44f267bf7151..1f45348824a0 100644 --- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-testing.nix +++ b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-testing.nix @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ { stdenv, buildPackages, fetchurl, perl, buildLinux, libelf, utillinux, ... } @ args: buildLinux (args // rec { - version = "4.19-rc1"; - modDirVersion = "4.19.0-rc1"; + version = "4.19-rc2"; + modDirVersion = "4.19.0-rc2"; extraMeta.branch = "4.19"; src = fetchurl { url = "https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/t/linux-${version}.tar.gz"; - sha256 = "14c9xg9sv0jrdri36das97vdbybi7vmcy59mj9wmgaz81cdk3wg5"; + sha256 = "0a5ip4dxv5y1mdi03m5rnz2l9k6kv30gciss6fag41lwsfwwln3z"; }; # Should the testing kernels ever be built on Hydra? -- cgit 1.4.1 From 9b48a677316ec1e34821e19bf8af68ef0dda6fa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimír Čunát Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018 16:53:02 +0200 Subject: treewide: fix various links (homepage, src) --- pkgs/development/libraries/jbig2dec/default.nix | 4 ++-- pkgs/development/libraries/libsigcxx/1.2.nix | 2 +- pkgs/development/libraries/libsigcxx/default.nix | 2 +- pkgs/os-specific/linux/lm-sensors/default.nix | 5 +++-- pkgs/tools/graphics/imgur-screenshot/default.nix | 2 +- pkgs/tools/networking/dnscrypt-proxy/1.x/default.nix | 2 +- pkgs/tools/networking/dnscrypt-wrapper/default.nix | 2 +- pkgs/tools/networking/dnsperf/default.nix | 2 +- 8 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'pkgs/os-specific/linux') diff --git a/pkgs/development/libraries/jbig2dec/default.nix b/pkgs/development/libraries/jbig2dec/default.nix index cc838be0f4f0..1839d5519fcc 100644 --- a/pkgs/development/libraries/jbig2dec/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/development/libraries/jbig2dec/default.nix @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { name = "jbig2dec-0.14"; src = fetchurl { - url = "http://downloads.ghostscript.com/public/jbig2dec/${name}.tar.gz"; + url = "https://github.com/ArtifexSoftware/ghostpdl-downloads/releases/download/gs922/jbig2dec-0.14.tar.gz"; sha256 = "0k01hp0q4275fj4rbr1gy64svfraw5w7wvwl08yjhvsnpb1rid11"; }; @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { doCheck = false; # fails 1 of 4 tests meta = { - homepage = https://www.ghostscript.com/jbig2dec.html; + homepage = https://www.jbig2dec.com/; description = "Decoder implementation of the JBIG2 image compression format"; license = stdenv.lib.licenses.gpl2Plus; platforms = stdenv.lib.platforms.unix; diff --git a/pkgs/development/libraries/libsigcxx/1.2.nix b/pkgs/development/libraries/libsigcxx/1.2.nix index 9fc6ff86773b..38e5ffcb4de0 100644 --- a/pkgs/development/libraries/libsigcxx/1.2.nix +++ b/pkgs/development/libraries/libsigcxx/1.2.nix @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { buildInputs = [ m4]; meta = { - homepage = http://libsigc.sourceforge.net/; + homepage = https://libsigcplusplus.github.io/libsigcplusplus/; description = "A typesafe callback system for standard C++"; branch = "1.2"; platforms = stdenv.lib.platforms.unix; diff --git a/pkgs/development/libraries/libsigcxx/default.nix b/pkgs/development/libraries/libsigcxx/default.nix index def5ee0e19a2..8eba5377bc34 100644 --- a/pkgs/development/libraries/libsigcxx/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/development/libraries/libsigcxx/default.nix @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { doCheck = true; meta = with stdenv.lib; { - homepage = http://libsigc.sourceforge.net/; + homepage = https://libsigcplusplus.github.io/libsigcplusplus/; description = "A typesafe callback system for standard C++"; license = licenses.lgpl21; platforms = platforms.all; diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/lm-sensors/default.nix b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/lm-sensors/default.nix index af52dc551ddd..04ce60c87b04 100644 --- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/lm-sensors/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/lm-sensors/default.nix @@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { src = fetchurl { urls = [ - "http://dl.lm-sensors.org/lm-sensors/releases/lm_sensors-${version}.tar.bz2" + # "http://dl.lm-sensors.org/lm-sensors/releases/lm_sensors-${version}.tar.bz2" # dead + # https://github.com/lm-sensors/lm-sensors/releases/... # only generated tarballs "https://src.fedoraproject.org/repo/pkgs/lm_sensors/lm_sensors-${version}.tar.bz2/c03675ae9d43d60322110c679416901a/lm_sensors-${version}.tar.bz2" ]; sha256 = "07q6811l4pp0f7pxr8bk3s97ippb84mx5qdg7v92s9hs10b90mz0"; @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { ''; meta = with stdenv.lib; { - homepage = http://www.lm-sensors.org/; + homepage = https://hwmon.wiki.kernel.org/lm_sensors; description = "Tools for reading hardware sensors"; license = with licenses; [ gpl2 lgpl21 ]; platforms = platforms.linux; diff --git a/pkgs/tools/graphics/imgur-screenshot/default.nix b/pkgs/tools/graphics/imgur-screenshot/default.nix index e9f1ad5dacd7..8db5b6c7dea7 100644 --- a/pkgs/tools/graphics/imgur-screenshot/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/tools/graphics/imgur-screenshot/default.nix @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ in stdenv.mkDerivation rec { meta = with stdenv.lib; { description = "A tool for easy screencapping and uploading to imgur"; - homepage = https://https://github.com/jomo/imgur-screenshot/; + homepage = https://github.com/jomo/imgur-screenshot/; platforms = platforms.linux; license = licenses.mit; maintainers = with maintainers; [ lw ]; diff --git a/pkgs/tools/networking/dnscrypt-proxy/1.x/default.nix b/pkgs/tools/networking/dnscrypt-proxy/1.x/default.nix index 6120b821bf41..d555a74ffb1a 100644 --- a/pkgs/tools/networking/dnscrypt-proxy/1.x/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/tools/networking/dnscrypt-proxy/1.x/default.nix @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { meta = { description = "A tool for securing communications between a client and a DNS resolver"; - homepage = https://dnscrypt.org/; + homepage = https://dnscrypt.info/; license = licenses.isc; maintainers = with maintainers; [ joachifm jgeerds ]; # upstream claims OSX support, but Hydra fails diff --git a/pkgs/tools/networking/dnscrypt-wrapper/default.nix b/pkgs/tools/networking/dnscrypt-wrapper/default.nix index 4351fd84dcdb..7ed1dbf3220e 100644 --- a/pkgs/tools/networking/dnscrypt-wrapper/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/tools/networking/dnscrypt-wrapper/default.nix @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { meta = with stdenv.lib; { description = "A tool for adding dnscrypt support to any name resolver"; - homepage = https://dnscrypt.org/; + homepage = https://dnscrypt.info/; license = licenses.isc; maintainers = with maintainers; [ tstrobel joachifm ]; platforms = platforms.linux; diff --git a/pkgs/tools/networking/dnsperf/default.nix b/pkgs/tools/networking/dnsperf/default.nix index 015046f2bdaa..9d6b85092efc 100644 --- a/pkgs/tools/networking/dnsperf/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/tools/networking/dnsperf/default.nix @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { outputsToInstall = outputs; # The man pages and PDFs are likely useful to most. description = "Tools for DNS benchmaring"; - homepage = https://nominum.com/measurement-tools/; + homepage = https://www.akamai.com/us/en/products/network-operator/measurement-tools.jsp; license = licenses.isc; platforms = platforms.unix; maintainers = [ maintainers.vcunat ]; -- cgit 1.4.1 From 5fccac2b8d77a660a968809519710a5bb7838e63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tim Steinbach Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018 11:18:11 -0400 Subject: kernel: Remove Copperhead The patches are unmaintained and suggest a false sense of security --- nixos/release.nix | 1 - nixos/tests/kernel-copperhead.nix | 19 - .../os-specific/linux/kernel/copperhead-4-14.patch | 2864 -------------------- .../os-specific/linux/kernel/copperhead-4-16.patch | 2571 ------------------ .../linux/kernel/linux-copperhead-lts.nix | 30 - pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/patches.nix | 10 - pkgs/top-level/all-packages.nix | 10 - 7 files changed, 5505 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 nixos/tests/kernel-copperhead.nix delete mode 100644 pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/copperhead-4-14.patch delete mode 100644 pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/copperhead-4-16.patch delete mode 100644 pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-copperhead-lts.nix (limited to 'pkgs/os-specific/linux') diff --git a/nixos/release.nix b/nixos/release.nix index 1013053b5b3b..17f51d977c98 100644 --- a/nixos/release.nix +++ b/nixos/release.nix @@ -327,7 +327,6 @@ in rec { tests.keymap = callSubTests tests/keymap.nix {}; tests.initrdNetwork = callTest tests/initrd-network.nix {}; tests.kafka = callSubTests tests/kafka.nix {}; - tests.kernel-copperhead = callTest tests/kernel-copperhead.nix {}; tests.kernel-latest = callTest tests/kernel-latest.nix {}; tests.kernel-lts = callTest tests/kernel-lts.nix {}; tests.kubernetes.dns = callSubTestsOnMatchingSystems ["x86_64-linux"] tests/kubernetes/dns.nix {}; diff --git a/nixos/tests/kernel-copperhead.nix b/nixos/tests/kernel-copperhead.nix deleted file mode 100644 index 652fbf055373..000000000000 --- a/nixos/tests/kernel-copperhead.nix +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -import ./make-test.nix ({ pkgs, ...} : { - name = "kernel-copperhead"; - meta = with pkgs.stdenv.lib.maintainers; { - maintainers = [ nequissimus ]; - }; - - machine = { pkgs, ... }: - { - boot.kernelPackages = pkgs.linuxPackages_copperhead_lts; - }; - - testScript = - '' - $machine->succeed("uname -a"); - $machine->succeed("uname -s | grep 'Linux'"); - $machine->succeed("uname -a | grep '${pkgs.linuxPackages_copperhead_lts.kernel.modDirVersion}'"); - $machine->succeed("uname -a | grep 'hardened'"); - ''; -}) diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/copperhead-4-14.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/copperhead-4-14.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 78112d164f06..000000000000 --- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/copperhead-4-14.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2864 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt -index 0380a45ecf4b..39956a3ef645 100644 ---- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt -+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt -@@ -490,16 +490,6 @@ - nosocket -- Disable socket memory accounting. - nokmem -- Disable kernel memory accounting. - -- checkreqprot [SELINUX] Set initial checkreqprot flag value. -- Format: { "0" | "1" } -- See security/selinux/Kconfig help text. -- 0 -- check protection applied by kernel (includes -- any implied execute protection). -- 1 -- check protection requested by application. -- Default value is set via a kernel config option. -- Value can be changed at runtime via -- /selinux/checkreqprot. -- - cio_ignore= [S390] - See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details. - clk_ignore_unused -@@ -2899,6 +2889,11 @@ - the specified number of seconds. This is to be used if - your oopses keep scrolling off the screen. - -+ extra_latent_entropy -+ Enable a very simple form of latent entropy extraction -+ from the first 4GB of memory as the bootmem allocator -+ passes the memory pages to the buddy allocator. -+ - pcbit= [HW,ISDN] - - pcd. [PARIDE] -diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt -index 694968c7523c..002d86416ef8 100644 ---- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt -+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt -@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: - - sysctl_writes_strict - - tainted - - threads-max -+- tiocsti_restrict - - unknown_nmi_panic - - watchdog - - watchdog_thresh -@@ -999,6 +1000,26 @@ available RAM pages threads-max is reduced accordingly. - - ============================================================== - -+tiocsti_restrict: -+ -+This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented -+from using the TIOCSTI ioctl to inject commands into other processes -+which share a tty session. -+ -+When tiocsti_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions(accept -+the default restriction of only being able to injection commands into -+one's own tty). When tiocsti_restrict is set to (1), users must -+have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use the TIOCSTI ioctl. -+ -+When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability -+CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally -+opened the tty. -+ -+The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT sets the -+default value of tiocsti_restrict. -+ -+============================================================== -+ - unknown_nmi_panic: - - The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the -diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile -index 787cf6605209..e4fda5330730 100644 ---- a/Makefile -+++ b/Makefile -@@ -710,6 +710,9 @@ endif - KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flag) - - ifeq ($(cc-name),clang) -+ifdef CONFIG_LOCAL_INIT -+KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fsanitize=local-init -+endif - KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Qunused-arguments,) - KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, unused-variable) - KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, format-invalid-specifier) -diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig -index 400b9e1b2f27..4637096f7902 100644 ---- a/arch/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/Kconfig -@@ -440,6 +440,11 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY - is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and - irq processing. - -+ When extra_latent_entropy is passed on the kernel command line, -+ entropy will be extracted from up to the first 4GB of RAM while the -+ runtime memory allocator is being initialized. This costs even more -+ slowdown of the boot process. -+ - Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically - secure! - -@@ -533,7 +538,7 @@ config CC_STACKPROTECTOR - choice - prompt "Stack Protector buffer overflow detection" - depends on HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR -- default CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE -+ default CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG - help - This option turns on the "stack-protector" GCC feature. This - feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on -@@ -735,7 +740,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS - int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT - range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX - default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT -- default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN -+ default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX - depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS - help - This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to -@@ -769,7 +774,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS - int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT - range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX - default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT -- default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN -+ default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX - depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS - help - This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to -@@ -952,6 +957,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT - - config REFCOUNT_FULL - bool "Perform full reference count validation at the expense of speed" -+ default y - help - Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast - unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked -diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig -index 2d5f7aca156d..aa4839a74c6a 100644 ---- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig -@@ -918,6 +918,7 @@ endif - - config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN - bool "Emulate Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching" -+ default y - help - Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing - user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved -@@ -1044,6 +1045,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE - bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image" - select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES - select RELOCATABLE -+ default y - help - Randomizes the virtual address at which the kernel image is - loaded, as a security feature that deters exploit attempts -diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug -index cc6bd559af85..01d5442d4722 100644 ---- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug -+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug -@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ config ARM64_RANDOMIZE_TEXT_OFFSET - config DEBUG_WX - bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot" - select ARM64_PTDUMP_CORE -+ default y - ---help--- - Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot. - -diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig -index 34480e9af2e7..26304242250c 100644 ---- a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig -+++ b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig -@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ --CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y - CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y - CONFIG_AUDIT=y - CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y -diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h -index 33be513ef24c..6f0c0e3ef0dd 100644 ---- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h -+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h -@@ -114,10 +114,10 @@ - - /* - * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On -- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address -+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address - * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers. - */ --#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3) -+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE 0x100000000UL - - #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ - -@@ -158,10 +158,10 @@ extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, - /* 1GB of VA */ - #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - #define STACK_RND_MASK (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \ -- 0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \ -- 0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) -+ ((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \ -+ ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) - #else --#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) -+#define STACK_RND_MASK (((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) - #endif - - #ifdef __AARCH64EB__ -diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c -index 9e773732520c..91359f45b5fc 100644 ---- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c -+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c -@@ -419,9 +419,9 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp) - unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm) - { - if (is_compat_task()) -- return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_32M); -+ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE; - else -- return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_1G); -+ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE; - } - - /* -diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig -index 7483cd514c32..835a86c45fb0 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig -@@ -1153,8 +1153,7 @@ config VM86 - default X86_LEGACY_VM86 - - config X86_16BIT -- bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments" if EXPERT -- default y -+ bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments" - depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL - ---help--- - This option is required by programs like Wine to run 16-bit -@@ -2228,7 +2227,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO - choice - prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications" - depends on X86_64 -- default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE -+ default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE - help - Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects - to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in -@@ -2318,8 +2317,7 @@ config CMDLINE_OVERRIDE - be set to 'N' under normal conditions. - - config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL -- bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)" if EXPERT -- default y -+ bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)" - ---help--- - Linux can allow user programs to install a per-process x86 - Local Descriptor Table (LDT) using the modify_ldt(2) system -diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug -index 6293a8768a91..add82e0f1df3 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug -+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug -@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ config EFI_PGT_DUMP - config DEBUG_WX - bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot" - select X86_PTDUMP_CORE -+ default y - ---help--- - Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot. - -diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig -index e32fc1f274d8..d08acc76502a 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig -+++ b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig -@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ - # CONFIG_LOCALVERSION_AUTO is not set --CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y - CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y - CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT=y - CONFIG_TASKSTATS=y -diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c -index 1911310959f8..bba8dbbc07a8 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c -+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c -@@ -203,55 +203,9 @@ static int map_vdso(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr) - } - - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 --/* -- * Put the vdso above the (randomized) stack with another randomized -- * offset. This way there is no hole in the middle of address space. -- * To save memory make sure it is still in the same PTE as the stack -- * top. This doesn't give that many random bits. -- * -- * Note that this algorithm is imperfect: the distribution of the vdso -- * start address within a PMD is biased toward the end. -- * -- * Only used for the 64-bit and x32 vdsos. -- */ --static unsigned long vdso_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned len) --{ -- unsigned long addr, end; -- unsigned offset; -- -- /* -- * Round up the start address. It can start out unaligned as a result -- * of stack start randomization. -- */ -- start = PAGE_ALIGN(start); -- -- /* Round the lowest possible end address up to a PMD boundary. */ -- end = (start + len + PMD_SIZE - 1) & PMD_MASK; -- if (end >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) -- end = TASK_SIZE_MAX; -- end -= len; -- -- if (end > start) { -- offset = get_random_int() % (((end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1); -- addr = start + (offset << PAGE_SHIFT); -- } else { -- addr = start; -- } -- -- /* -- * Forcibly align the final address in case we have a hardware -- * issue that requires alignment for performance reasons. -- */ -- addr = align_vdso_addr(addr); -- -- return addr; --} -- - static int map_vdso_randomized(const struct vdso_image *image) - { -- unsigned long addr = vdso_addr(current->mm->start_stack, image->size-image->sym_vvar_start); -- -- return map_vdso(image, addr); -+ return map_vdso(image, 0); - } - #endif - -diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h -index 3a091cea36c5..0931c05a3348 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h -@@ -249,11 +249,11 @@ extern int force_personality32; - - /* - * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On -- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address -+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address - * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers. - */ - #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (mmap_is_ia32() ? 0x000400000UL : \ -- (DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW / 3 * 2)) -+ 0x100000000UL) - - /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what - instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space, -@@ -312,8 +312,8 @@ extern unsigned long get_mmap_base(int is_legacy); - - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - --#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) (0x7ff) --#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x7ff) -+#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) -+#define STACK_RND_MASK ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) - - #define ARCH_DLINFO ARCH_DLINFO_IA32 - -@@ -322,7 +322,11 @@ extern unsigned long get_mmap_base(int is_legacy); - #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ - - /* 1GB for 64bit, 8MB for 32bit */ --#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? 0x7ff : 0x3fffff) -+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT -+#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? (1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1 : (1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) -+#else -+#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) -+#endif - #define STACK_RND_MASK __STACK_RND_MASK(mmap_is_ia32()) - - #define ARCH_DLINFO \ -@@ -380,5 +384,4 @@ struct va_alignment { - } ____cacheline_aligned; - - extern struct va_alignment va_align; --extern unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long); - #endif /* _ASM_X86_ELF_H */ -diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h -index 704f31315dde..bb82b6344a7b 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h -@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ static inline void cr4_set_bits(unsigned long mask) - unsigned long cr4; - - cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); -+ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4()); - if ((cr4 | mask) != cr4) { - cr4 |= mask; - this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, cr4); -@@ -266,6 +267,7 @@ static inline void cr4_clear_bits(unsigned long mask) - unsigned long cr4; - - cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); -+ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4()); - if ((cr4 & ~mask) != cr4) { - cr4 &= ~mask; - this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, cr4); -@@ -278,6 +280,7 @@ static inline void cr4_toggle_bits(unsigned long mask) - unsigned long cr4; - - cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); -+ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4()); - cr4 ^= mask; - this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, cr4); - __write_cr4(cr4); -@@ -386,6 +389,7 @@ static inline void __native_flush_tlb_global(void) - raw_local_irq_save(flags); - - cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); -+ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4()); - /* toggle PGE */ - native_write_cr4(cr4 ^ X86_CR4_PGE); - /* write old PGE again and flush TLBs */ -diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -index 48e98964ecad..a94dc690612f 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -@@ -1637,7 +1637,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) - wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0); - barrier(); - -- x86_configure_nx(); - x2apic_setup(); - - /* -diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c -index 988a98f34c66..dc36d2d9078a 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c -@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include -+#include - - /* - * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux, -@@ -719,7 +721,10 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp) - - unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm) - { -- return randomize_page(mm->brk, 0x02000000); -+ if (mmap_is_ia32()) -+ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE; -+ else -+ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE; - } - - /* -diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c -index a63fe77b3217..e1085e76043e 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c -@@ -54,13 +54,6 @@ static unsigned long get_align_bits(void) - return va_align.bits & get_align_mask(); - } - --unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long addr) --{ -- unsigned long align_mask = get_align_mask(); -- addr = (addr + align_mask) & ~align_mask; -- return addr | get_align_bits(); --} -- - static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str) - { - /* guard against enabling this on other CPU families */ -@@ -122,10 +115,7 @@ static void find_start_end(unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags, - } - - *begin = get_mmap_base(1); -- if (in_compat_syscall()) -- *end = task_size_32bit(); -- else -- *end = task_size_64bit(addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW); -+ *end = get_mmap_base(0); - } - - unsigned long -@@ -206,7 +196,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0, - - info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN; - info.length = len; -- info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE; -+ info.low_limit = get_mmap_base(1); - info.high_limit = get_mmap_base(0); - - /* -diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c -index 3141e67ec24c..e93173193f60 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c -+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c -@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ static void __init pagetable_init(void) - permanent_kmaps_init(pgd_base); - } - --pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL); -+pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL); - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask); - - /* user-defined highmem size */ -@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ int arch_remove_memory(u64 start, u64 size) - #endif - #endif - --int kernel_set_to_readonly __read_mostly; -+int kernel_set_to_readonly __ro_after_init; - - void set_kernel_text_rw(void) - { -@@ -917,12 +917,11 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) - unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text); - unsigned long size = PFN_ALIGN(_etext) - start; - -+ kernel_set_to_readonly = 1; - set_pages_ro(virt_to_page(start), size >> PAGE_SHIFT); - printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel text: %luk\n", - size >> 10); - -- kernel_set_to_readonly = 1; -- - #ifdef CONFIG_CPA_DEBUG - printk(KERN_INFO "Testing CPA: Reverting %lx-%lx\n", - start, start+size); -diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c -index 642357aff216..8bbf93ce3cd2 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c -+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c -@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ - * around without checking the pgd every time. - */ - --pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0; -+pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~0; - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask); - - int force_personality32; -@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void) - mem_init_print_info(NULL); - } - --int kernel_set_to_readonly; -+int kernel_set_to_readonly __ro_after_init; - - void set_kernel_text_rw(void) - { -@@ -1234,9 +1234,8 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) - - printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel read-only data: %luk\n", - (end - start) >> 10); -- set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT); -- - kernel_set_to_readonly = 1; -+ set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT); - - /* - * The rodata/data/bss/brk section (but not the kernel text!) -diff --git a/block/blk-softirq.c b/block/blk-softirq.c -index 01e2b353a2b9..9aeddca4a29f 100644 ---- a/block/blk-softirq.c -+++ b/block/blk-softirq.c -@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, blk_cpu_done); - * Softirq action handler - move entries to local list and loop over them - * while passing them to the queue registered handler. - */ --static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(struct softirq_action *h) -+static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(void) - { - struct list_head *cpu_list, local_list; - -diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c -index 473f150d6b22..65a65f9824ed 100644 ---- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c -+++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c -@@ -5141,7 +5141,7 @@ void ata_qc_free(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) - struct ata_port *ap; - unsigned int tag; - -- WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */ -+ BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */ - ap = qc->ap; - - qc->flags = 0; -@@ -5158,7 +5158,7 @@ void __ata_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) - struct ata_port *ap; - struct ata_link *link; - -- WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */ -+ BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_ACTIVE)); - ap = qc->ap; - link = qc->dev->link; -diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig -index c28dca0c613d..d4813f0d25ca 100644 ---- a/drivers/char/Kconfig -+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig -@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ source "drivers/tty/Kconfig" - - config DEVMEM - bool "/dev/mem virtual device support" -- default y - help - Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/mem device. - The /dev/mem device is used to access areas of physical -@@ -568,7 +567,6 @@ config TELCLOCK - config DEVPORT - bool "/dev/port character device" - depends on ISA || PCI -- default y - help - Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/port device. The /dev/port - device is similar to /dev/mem, but for I/O ports. -diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c -index e105532bfba8..e07d52bb9b62 100644 ---- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c -+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c -@@ -1462,7 +1462,7 @@ static int cx24116_tune(struct dvb_frontend *fe, bool re_tune, - return cx24116_read_status(fe, status); - } - --static int cx24116_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) -+static enum dvbfe_algo cx24116_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) - { - return DVBFE_ALGO_HW; - } -diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24117.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24117.c -index d37cb7762bd6..97e0feff0ede 100644 ---- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24117.c -+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24117.c -@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ static int cx24117_tune(struct dvb_frontend *fe, bool re_tune, - return cx24117_read_status(fe, status); - } - --static int cx24117_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) -+static enum dvbfe_algo cx24117_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) - { - return DVBFE_ALGO_HW; - } -diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24120.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24120.c -index 7f11dcc94d85..01da670760ba 100644 ---- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24120.c -+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24120.c -@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@ static int cx24120_tune(struct dvb_frontend *fe, bool re_tune, - return cx24120_read_status(fe, status); - } - --static int cx24120_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) -+static enum dvbfe_algo cx24120_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) - { - return DVBFE_ALGO_HW; - } -diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24123.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24123.c -index 1d59d1d3bd82..41cd0e9ea199 100644 ---- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24123.c -+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24123.c -@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ static int cx24123_tune(struct dvb_frontend *fe, - return retval; - } - --static int cx24123_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) -+static enum dvbfe_algo cx24123_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) - { - return DVBFE_ALGO_HW; - } -diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2820r_core.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2820r_core.c -index f6ebbb47b9b2..3e0d8cbd76da 100644 ---- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2820r_core.c -+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cxd2820r_core.c -@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static enum dvbfe_search cxd2820r_search(struct dvb_frontend *fe) - return DVBFE_ALGO_SEARCH_ERROR; - } - --static int cxd2820r_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) -+static enum dvbfe_algo cxd2820r_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) - { - return DVBFE_ALGO_CUSTOM; - } -diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mb86a20s.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mb86a20s.c -index e8ac8c3e2ec0..e0f4ba8302d1 100644 ---- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mb86a20s.c -+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mb86a20s.c -@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@ static void mb86a20s_release(struct dvb_frontend *fe) - kfree(state); - } - --static int mb86a20s_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) -+static enum dvbfe_algo mb86a20s_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) - { - return DVBFE_ALGO_HW; - } -diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/s921.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/s921.c -index 274544a3ae0e..9ef9b9bc1bd2 100644 ---- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/s921.c -+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/s921.c -@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static int s921_tune(struct dvb_frontend *fe, - return rc; - } - --static int s921_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) -+static enum dvbfe_algo s921_get_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) - { - return DVBFE_ALGO_HW; - } -diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/dst.c b/drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/dst.c -index 7166d2279465..fa682f9fdc4b 100644 ---- a/drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/dst.c -+++ b/drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/dst.c -@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ static int dst_tune_frontend(struct dvb_frontend* fe, - return 0; - } - --static int dst_get_tuning_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) -+static enum dvbfe_algo dst_get_tuning_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) - { - return dst_algo ? DVBFE_ALGO_HW : DVBFE_ALGO_SW; - } -diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007s.c b/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007s.c -index f75f69556be7..d913a6050e8c 100644 ---- a/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007s.c -+++ b/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007s.c -@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int va1j5jf8007s_read_snr(struct dvb_frontend *fe, u16 *snr) - return 0; - } - --static int va1j5jf8007s_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) -+static enum dvbfe_algo va1j5jf8007s_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) - { - return DVBFE_ALGO_HW; - } -diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007t.c b/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007t.c -index 63fda79a75c0..4115c3ccd4a8 100644 ---- a/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007t.c -+++ b/drivers/media/pci/pt1/va1j5jf8007t.c -@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int va1j5jf8007t_read_snr(struct dvb_frontend *fe, u16 *snr) - return 0; - } - --static int va1j5jf8007t_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) -+static enum dvbfe_algo va1j5jf8007t_get_frontend_algo(struct dvb_frontend *fe) - { - return DVBFE_ALGO_HW; - } -diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c -index 981b3ef71e47..9883da1da383 100644 ---- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c -+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c -@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static irqreturn_t jp_handle_irq_event(unsigned int irq, - return 0; - } - --static void jp_tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a) -+static void jp_tasklet_action(void) - { - lkdtm_handler(); - jprobe_return(); -diff --git a/drivers/tty/Kconfig b/drivers/tty/Kconfig -index b811442c5ce6..4f62a63cbcb1 100644 ---- a/drivers/tty/Kconfig -+++ b/drivers/tty/Kconfig -@@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ config UNIX98_PTYS - - config LEGACY_PTYS - bool "Legacy (BSD) PTY support" -- default y - ---help--- - A pseudo terminal (PTY) is a software device consisting of two - halves: a master and a slave. The slave device behaves identical to -diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c -index 562d31073f9a..2184b9b5485f 100644 ---- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c -+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c -@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ static void free_tty_struct(struct tty_struct *tty) - put_device(tty->dev); - kfree(tty->write_buf); - tty->magic = 0xDEADDEAD; -+ put_user_ns(tty->owner_user_ns); - kfree(tty); - } - -@@ -2154,11 +2155,19 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) - * FIXME: may race normal receive processing - */ - -+int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT); -+ - static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p) - { - char ch, mbz = 0; - struct tty_ldisc *ld; - -+ if (tiocsti_restrict && -+ !ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { -+ dev_warn_ratelimited(tty->dev, -+ "Denied TIOCSTI ioctl for non-privileged process\n"); -+ return -EPERM; -+ } - if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - if (get_user(ch, p)) -@@ -2841,6 +2850,7 @@ struct tty_struct *alloc_tty_struct(struct tty_driver *driver, int idx) - tty->index = idx; - tty_line_name(driver, idx, tty->name); - tty->dev = tty_get_device(tty); -+ tty->owner_user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns()); - - return tty; - } -diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c -index 442be7f312f6..788557d5c454 100644 ---- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c -+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c -@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ - #define USB_VENDOR_GENESYS_LOGIC 0x05e3 - #define HUB_QUIRK_CHECK_PORT_AUTOSUSPEND 0x01 - -+extern int deny_new_usb; -+ - /* Protect struct usb_device->state and ->children members - * Note: Both are also protected by ->dev.sem, except that ->state can - * change to USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED even when the semaphore isn't held. */ -@@ -4806,6 +4808,12 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus, - goto done; - return; - } -+ -+ if (deny_new_usb) { -+ dev_err(&port_dev->dev, "denied insert of USB device on port %d\n", port1); -+ goto done; -+ } -+ - if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev)) - unit_load = 150; - else -diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c -index 0da4d748b4e6..69fcee853363 100644 ---- a/fs/exec.c -+++ b/fs/exec.c -@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - #include - #include -@@ -321,6 +322,8 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) - arch_bprm_mm_init(mm, vma); - up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); - bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *); -+ if (randomize_va_space) -+ bprm->p ^= get_random_int() & ~PAGE_MASK; - return 0; - err: - up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); -diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c -index 0b46b858cd42..3ae8e72341da 100644 ---- a/fs/namei.c -+++ b/fs/namei.c -@@ -902,8 +902,8 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd) - path_put(&last->link); - } - --int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 0; --int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0; -+int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 1; -+int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1; - - /** - * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations -diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig -index 5f93cfacb3d1..cea0d7d3b23e 100644 ---- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig -+++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig -@@ -195,4 +195,3 @@ config NFS_DEBUG - bool - depends on NFS_FS && SUNRPC_DEBUG - select CRC32 -- default y -diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c -index 8ef7d7bef775..b82f305ec13d 100644 ---- a/fs/pipe.c -+++ b/fs/pipe.c -@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ unsigned int pipe_max_size = 1048576; - /* - * Minimum pipe size, as required by POSIX - */ --unsigned int pipe_min_size = PAGE_SIZE; -+unsigned int pipe_min_size __read_only = PAGE_SIZE; - - /* Maximum allocatable pages per user. Hard limit is unset by default, soft - * matches default values. -diff --git a/fs/proc/Kconfig b/fs/proc/Kconfig -index 1ade1206bb89..60b0f76dec47 100644 ---- a/fs/proc/Kconfig -+++ b/fs/proc/Kconfig -@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ config PROC_KCORE - config PROC_VMCORE - bool "/proc/vmcore support" - depends on PROC_FS && CRASH_DUMP -- default y - help - Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format. - -diff --git a/fs/stat.c b/fs/stat.c -index 873785dae022..d3c2ada8b9c7 100644 ---- a/fs/stat.c -+++ b/fs/stat.c -@@ -40,8 +40,13 @@ void generic_fillattr(struct inode *inode, struct kstat *stat) - stat->gid = inode->i_gid; - stat->rdev = inode->i_rdev; - stat->size = i_size_read(inode); -- stat->atime = inode->i_atime; -- stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime; -+ if (is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) { -+ stat->atime = inode->i_ctime; -+ stat->mtime = inode->i_ctime; -+ } else { -+ stat->atime = inode->i_atime; -+ stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime; -+ } - stat->ctime = inode->i_ctime; - stat->blksize = i_blocksize(inode); - stat->blocks = inode->i_blocks; -@@ -75,9 +80,14 @@ int vfs_getattr_nosec(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, - stat->result_mask |= STATX_BASIC_STATS; - request_mask &= STATX_ALL; - query_flags &= KSTAT_QUERY_FLAGS; -- if (inode->i_op->getattr) -- return inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask, -- query_flags); -+ if (inode->i_op->getattr) { -+ int retval = inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask, query_flags); -+ if (!retval && is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) { -+ stat->atime = stat->ctime; -+ stat->mtime = stat->ctime; -+ } -+ return retval; -+ } - - generic_fillattr(inode, stat); - return 0; -diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h -index 750621e41d1c..e7157c18c62c 100644 ---- a/include/linux/cache.h -+++ b/include/linux/cache.h -@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ - #define __ro_after_init __attribute__((__section__(".data..ro_after_init"))) - #endif - -+#define __read_only __ro_after_init -+ - #ifndef ____cacheline_aligned - #define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES))) - #endif -diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h -index f640dcbc880c..2b4f5d651f19 100644 ---- a/include/linux/capability.h -+++ b/include/linux/capability.h -@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap); - extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); - extern bool capable(int cap); -+extern bool capable_noaudit(int cap); - extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); - extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); - #else -@@ -232,6 +233,10 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap) - { - return true; - } -+static inline bool capable_noaudit(int cap) -+{ -+ return true; -+} - static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) - { - return true; -diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h -index cc613f20e5a6..7606596d6c2e 100644 ---- a/include/linux/fs.h -+++ b/include/linux/fs.h -@@ -3392,4 +3392,15 @@ static inline bool dir_relax_shared(struct inode *inode) - extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path); - extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); - -+extern int device_sidechannel_restrict; -+ -+static inline bool is_sidechannel_device(const struct inode *inode) -+{ -+ umode_t mode; -+ if (!device_sidechannel_restrict) -+ return false; -+ mode = inode->i_mode; -+ return ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && (mode & (S_IROTH | S_IWOTH))); -+} -+ - #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */ -diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h -index bdaf22582f6e..326ff15d4637 100644 ---- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h -+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h -@@ -181,6 +181,9 @@ static inline void fsnotify_access(struct file *file) - struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; - __u32 mask = FS_ACCESS; - -+ if (is_sidechannel_device(inode)) -+ return; -+ - if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) - mask |= FS_ISDIR; - -@@ -199,6 +202,9 @@ static inline void fsnotify_modify(struct file *file) - struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; - __u32 mask = FS_MODIFY; - -+ if (is_sidechannel_device(inode)) -+ return; -+ - if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) - mask |= FS_ISDIR; - -diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h -index b041f94678de..a5e0175c79e0 100644 ---- a/include/linux/gfp.h -+++ b/include/linux/gfp.h -@@ -518,9 +518,9 @@ extern struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, - extern unsigned long __get_free_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order); - extern unsigned long get_zeroed_page(gfp_t gfp_mask); - --void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask); -+void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - void free_pages_exact(void *virt, size_t size); --void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask); -+void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - - #define __get_free_page(gfp_mask) \ - __get_free_pages((gfp_mask), 0) -diff --git a/include/linux/highmem.h b/include/linux/highmem.h -index 776f90f3a1cd..3f5c47000059 100644 ---- a/include/linux/highmem.h -+++ b/include/linux/highmem.h -@@ -191,6 +191,13 @@ static inline void clear_highpage(struct page *page) - kunmap_atomic(kaddr); - } - -+static inline void verify_zero_highpage(struct page *page) -+{ -+ void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(page); -+ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE)); -+ kunmap_atomic(kaddr); -+} -+ - static inline void zero_user_segments(struct page *page, - unsigned start1, unsigned end1, - unsigned start2, unsigned end2) -diff --git a/include/linux/interrupt.h b/include/linux/interrupt.h -index 69c238210325..ee487ea4f48f 100644 ---- a/include/linux/interrupt.h -+++ b/include/linux/interrupt.h -@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ extern const char * const softirq_to_name[NR_SOFTIRQS]; - - struct softirq_action - { -- void (*action)(struct softirq_action *); -+ void (*action)(void); - }; - - asmlinkage void do_softirq(void); -@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static inline void do_softirq_own_stack(void) - } - #endif - --extern void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *)); -+extern void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void)); - extern void softirq_init(void); - extern void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr); - -diff --git a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h -index df32d2508290..c992d130b94d 100644 ---- a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h -+++ b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h -@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct kobj_ns_type_operations { - void (*drop_ns)(void *); - }; - --int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops); -+int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops); - int kobj_ns_type_registered(enum kobj_ns_type type); - const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_child_ns_ops(struct kobject *parent); - const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj); -diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h -index f23215854c80..98df98c44cc0 100644 ---- a/include/linux/mm.h -+++ b/include/linux/mm.h -@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ static inline int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x) - } - #endif - --extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node); -+extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) - { - return kvmalloc_node(size, flags, NUMA_NO_NODE); -diff --git a/include/linux/percpu.h b/include/linux/percpu.h -index 296bbe49d5d1..b26652c9a98d 100644 ---- a/include/linux/percpu.h -+++ b/include/linux/percpu.h -@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ extern int __init pcpu_page_first_chunk(size_t reserved_size, - pcpu_fc_populate_pte_fn_t populate_pte_fn); - #endif - --extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align); -+extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - extern bool __is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *can_addr); - extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr); - -@@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr); - extern void __init setup_per_cpu_areas(void); - #endif - --extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp); --extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align); -+extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - extern void free_percpu(void __percpu *__pdata); - extern phys_addr_t per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(void *addr); - -diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h -index 8e22f24ded6a..b7fecdfa6de5 100644 ---- a/include/linux/perf_event.h -+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h -@@ -1165,6 +1165,11 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, - int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, - void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); - -+static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void) -+{ -+ return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2; -+} -+ - static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(void) - { - return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1; -diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h -index ae5ed6492d54..fd0786124504 100644 ---- a/include/linux/slab.h -+++ b/include/linux/slab.h -@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ void memcg_destroy_kmem_caches(struct mem_cgroup *); - /* - * Common kmalloc functions provided by all allocators - */ --void * __must_check __krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t); --void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t); -+void * __must_check __krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute__((alloc_size(2))); -+void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute((alloc_size(2))); - void kfree(const void *); - void kzfree(const void *); - size_t ksize(const void *); -@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static __always_inline int kmalloc_index(size_t size) - } - #endif /* !CONFIG_SLOB */ - --void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc; -+void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc; - void kmem_cache_free(struct kmem_cache *, void *); - -@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static __always_inline void kfree_bulk(size_t size, void **p) - } - - #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA --void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc; -+void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc; - #else - static __always_inline void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) -@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static __always_inline void *kmalloc_large(size_t size, gfp_t flags) - * for general use, and so are not documented here. For a full list of - * potential flags, always refer to linux/gfp.h. - */ --static __always_inline void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) -+static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) - { - if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) { - if (size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE) -@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ static __always_inline int kmalloc_size(int n) - return 0; - } - --static __always_inline void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) -+static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) - { - #ifndef CONFIG_SLOB - if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && -diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h -index 39fa09bcde23..0b7a48cd883b 100644 ---- a/include/linux/slub_def.h -+++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h -@@ -120,6 +120,11 @@ struct kmem_cache { - unsigned long random; - #endif - -+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY -+ unsigned long random_active; -+ unsigned long random_inactive; -+#endif -+ - #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA - /* - * Defragmentation by allocating from a remote node. -diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h -index cfd83eb2f926..b9ecb42c762d 100644 ---- a/include/linux/string.h -+++ b/include/linux/string.h -@@ -234,10 +234,16 @@ void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob - void __read_overflow3(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 3rd parameter"); - void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter"); - -+#ifdef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE_STRICT_STRING -+#define __string_size(p) __builtin_object_size(p, 1) -+#else -+#define __string_size(p) __builtin_object_size(p, 0) -+#endif -+ - #if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) - __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) - { -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); - if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size) - __write_overflow(); - if (p_size < size) -@@ -247,7 +253,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) - - __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q) - { -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); - if (p_size == (size_t)-1) - return __builtin_strcat(p, q); - if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size) -@@ -258,7 +264,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q) - __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p) - { - __kernel_size_t ret; -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); - - /* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */ - if (p_size == (size_t)-1 || -@@ -273,7 +279,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p) - extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen); - __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *p, __kernel_size_t maxlen) - { -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); - __kernel_size_t ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size); - if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret) - fortify_panic(__func__); -@@ -285,8 +291,8 @@ extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy); - __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size) - { - size_t ret; -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); -+ size_t q_size = __string_size(q); - if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) - return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size); - ret = strlen(q); -@@ -306,8 +312,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size) - __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) - { - size_t p_len, copy_len; -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); -+ size_t q_size = __string_size(q); - if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) - return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count); - p_len = strlen(p); -@@ -420,8 +426,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) - /* defined after fortified strlen and memcpy to reuse them */ - __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q) - { -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); -+ size_t q_size = __string_size(q); - if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) - return __builtin_strcpy(p, q); - memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1); -diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h -index 1dd587ba6d88..9a9a04fb641d 100644 ---- a/include/linux/tty.h -+++ b/include/linux/tty.h -@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - - /* -@@ -335,6 +336,7 @@ struct tty_struct { - /* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */ - struct work_struct SAK_work; - struct tty_port *port; -+ struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns; - } __randomize_layout; - - /* Each of a tty's open files has private_data pointing to tty_file_private */ -@@ -344,6 +346,8 @@ struct tty_file_private { - struct list_head list; - }; - -+extern int tiocsti_restrict; -+ - /* tty magic number */ - #define TTY_MAGIC 0x5401 - -diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h -index 1e5d8c392f15..66d0e49c9987 100644 ---- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h -+++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h -@@ -68,19 +68,19 @@ static inline void vmalloc_init(void) - } - #endif - --extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size); --extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size); --extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size); --extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node); --extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node); --extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size); --extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size); --extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size); --extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot); -+extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - extern void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align, - unsigned long start, unsigned long end, gfp_t gfp_mask, - pgprot_t prot, unsigned long vm_flags, int node, -- const void *caller); -+ const void *caller) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - #ifndef CONFIG_MMU - extern void *__vmalloc_node_flags(unsigned long size, int node, gfp_t flags); - static inline void *__vmalloc_node_flags_caller(unsigned long size, int node, -diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig -index 46075327c165..0c78750bc76d 100644 ---- a/init/Kconfig -+++ b/init/Kconfig -@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ config USELIB - config AUDIT - bool "Auditing support" - depends on NET -+ default y - help - Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another - kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for -@@ -1052,6 +1053,12 @@ config CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE - - endchoice - -+config LOCAL_INIT -+ bool "Zero uninitialized locals" -+ help -+ Zero-fill uninitialized local variables, other than variable-length -+ arrays. Requires compiler support. -+ - config SYSCTL - bool - -@@ -1361,8 +1368,7 @@ config SHMEM - which may be appropriate on small systems without swap. - - config AIO -- bool "Enable AIO support" if EXPERT -- default y -+ bool "Enable AIO support" - help - This option enables POSIX asynchronous I/O which may by used - by some high performance threaded applications. Disabling -@@ -1491,7 +1497,7 @@ config VM_EVENT_COUNTERS - - config SLUB_DEBUG - default y -- bool "Enable SLUB debugging support" if EXPERT -+ bool "Enable SLUB debugging support" - depends on SLUB && SYSFS - help - SLUB has extensive debug support features. Disabling these can -@@ -1515,7 +1521,6 @@ config SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON - - config COMPAT_BRK - bool "Disable heap randomization" -- default y - help - Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it - also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based). -@@ -1562,7 +1567,6 @@ endchoice - - config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT - bool "Allow slab caches to be merged" -- default y - help - For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be - merged when they share the same size and other characteristics. -@@ -1575,9 +1579,9 @@ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT - command line. - - config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM -- default n - depends on SLAB || SLUB - bool "SLAB freelist randomization" -+ default y - help - Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This - security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab -@@ -1586,12 +1590,56 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM - config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED - bool "Harden slab freelist metadata" - depends on SLUB -+ default y - help - Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and - other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance - sacrifies to harden the kernel slab allocator against common - freelist exploit methods. - -+config SLAB_HARDENED -+ default y -+ depends on SLUB -+ bool "Hardened SLAB infrastructure" -+ help -+ Make minor performance sacrifices to harden the kernel slab -+ allocator. -+ -+config SLAB_CANARY -+ depends on SLUB -+ depends on !SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT -+ bool "SLAB canaries" -+ default y -+ help -+ Place canaries at the end of kernel slab allocations, sacrificing -+ some performance and memory usage for security. -+ -+ Canaries can detect some forms of heap corruption when allocations -+ are freed and as part of the HARDENED_USERCOPY feature. It provides -+ basic use-after-free detection for HARDENED_USERCOPY. -+ -+ Canaries absorb small overflows (rendering them harmless), mitigate -+ non-NUL terminated C string overflows on 64-bit via a guaranteed zero -+ byte and provide basic double-free detection. -+ -+config SLAB_SANITIZE -+ bool "Sanitize SLAB allocations" -+ depends on SLUB -+ default y -+ help -+ Zero fill slab allocations on free, reducing the lifetime of -+ sensitive data and helping to mitigate use-after-free bugs. -+ -+ For slabs with debug poisoning enabling, this has no impact. -+ -+config SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY -+ depends on SLAB_SANITIZE && PAGE_SANITIZE -+ default y -+ bool "Verify sanitized SLAB allocations" -+ help -+ Verify that newly allocated slab allocations are zeroed to detect -+ write-after-free bugs. -+ - config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL - default y - depends on SLUB && SMP -diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c -index 5b34d3114af4..e57930192ce1 100644 ---- a/kernel/audit.c -+++ b/kernel/audit.c -@@ -1573,6 +1573,9 @@ static int __init audit_enable(char *str) - audit_default = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); - if (!audit_default) - audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED; -+ else -+ audit_initialized = AUDIT_UNINITIALIZED; -+ - audit_enabled = audit_default; - audit_ever_enabled = !!audit_enabled; - -diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c -index d203a5d6b726..2a6c3e2c57a6 100644 ---- a/kernel/bpf/core.c -+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c -@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ void __weak bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *fp) - bpf_prog_unlock_free(fp); - } - --int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly; -+int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly = 2; - - static int bpf_jit_blind_insn(const struct bpf_insn *from, - const struct bpf_insn *aux, -diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c -index 4e933219fec6..0f37db32a2b1 100644 ---- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c -+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c -@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(prog_idr_lock); - static DEFINE_IDR(map_idr); - static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(map_idr_lock); - --int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly; -+int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly = 1; - - static const struct bpf_map_ops * const bpf_map_types[] = { - #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _ops) -diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c -index 1e1c0236f55b..452062fe45ce 100644 ---- a/kernel/capability.c -+++ b/kernel/capability.c -@@ -431,6 +431,12 @@ bool capable(int cap) - return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap); - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); -+ -+bool capable_noaudit(int cap) -+{ -+ return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, cap); -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_noaudit); - #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ - - /** -diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c -index cb8274d7824f..c1b3d232b0a4 100644 ---- a/kernel/events/core.c -+++ b/kernel/events/core.c -@@ -397,8 +397,13 @@ static cpumask_var_t perf_online_mask; - * 0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv - * 1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv - * 2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv -+ * 3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use - */ -+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT -+int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3; -+#else - int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2; -+#endif - - /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */ - int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */ -@@ -9941,6 +9946,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, - if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL) - return -EINVAL; - -+ if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) -+ return -EACCES; -+ - err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr); - if (err) - return err; -diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c -index 98c91bd341b4..dbb9540ee61c 100644 ---- a/kernel/fork.c -+++ b/kernel/fork.c -@@ -102,6 +102,11 @@ - - #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS - #include -+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS -+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone; -+#else -+#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0 -+#endif - - /* - * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel -@@ -1554,6 +1559,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( - if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - -+ if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) -+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); -+ - /* - * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads - * can only be started up within the thread group. -@@ -2347,6 +2356,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags) - if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS) - unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS; - -+ if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) { -+ err = -EPERM; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) -+ goto bad_unshare_out; -+ } -+ - err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags); - if (err) - goto bad_unshare_out; -diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c -index 0972a8e09d08..00dde7aad47a 100644 ---- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c -+++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c -@@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ void free_basic_memory_bitmaps(void) - - void clear_free_pages(void) - { --#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO -+#if defined(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) || defined(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE) - struct memory_bitmap *bm = free_pages_map; - unsigned long pfn; - -@@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ void clear_free_pages(void) - } - memory_bm_position_reset(bm); - pr_info("PM: free pages cleared after restore\n"); --#endif /* PAGE_POISONING_ZERO */ -+#endif /* PAGE_POISONING_ZERO || PAGE_SANITIZE */ - } - - /** -diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c -index a64eee0db39e..4d7de378fe4c 100644 ---- a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c -+++ b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c -@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static void __rcu_process_callbacks(struct rcu_ctrlblk *rcp) - } - } - --static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused) -+static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void) - { - __rcu_process_callbacks(&rcu_sched_ctrlblk); - __rcu_process_callbacks(&rcu_bh_ctrlblk); -diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree.c b/kernel/rcu/tree.c -index 3e3650e94ae6..7ecd7a5d04b3 100644 ---- a/kernel/rcu/tree.c -+++ b/kernel/rcu/tree.c -@@ -2918,7 +2918,7 @@ __rcu_process_callbacks(struct rcu_state *rsp) - /* - * Do RCU core processing for the current CPU. - */ --static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused) -+static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void) - { - struct rcu_state *rsp; - -diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c -index 5c09ddf8c832..f5db6ece105a 100644 ---- a/kernel/sched/fair.c -+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c -@@ -8986,7 +8986,7 @@ static void nohz_idle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, enum cpu_idle_type idle) { } - * run_rebalance_domains is triggered when needed from the scheduler tick. - * Also triggered for nohz idle balancing (with nohz_balancing_kick set). - */ --static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(struct softirq_action *h) -+static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(void) - { - struct rq *this_rq = this_rq(); - enum cpu_idle_type idle = this_rq->idle_balance ? -diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c -index e89c3b0cff6d..0d3ebd520931 100644 ---- a/kernel/softirq.c -+++ b/kernel/softirq.c -@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ irq_cpustat_t irq_stat[NR_CPUS] ____cacheline_aligned; - EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_stat); - #endif - --static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __cacheline_aligned_in_smp; -+static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __ro_after_init __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); - - DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, ksoftirqd); - -@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void) - kstat_incr_softirqs_this_cpu(vec_nr); - - trace_softirq_entry(vec_nr); -- h->action(h); -+ h->action(); - trace_softirq_exit(vec_nr); - if (unlikely(prev_count != preempt_count())) { - pr_err("huh, entered softirq %u %s %p with preempt_count %08x, exited with %08x?\n", -@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr) - or_softirq_pending(1UL << nr); - } - --void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *)) -+void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void)) - { - softirq_vec[nr].action = action; - } -@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ void __tasklet_hi_schedule(struct tasklet_struct *t) - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tasklet_hi_schedule); - --static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a) -+static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(void) - { - struct tasklet_struct *list; - -@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a) - } - } - --static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(struct softirq_action *a) -+static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(void) - { - struct tasklet_struct *list; - -diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c -index 069550540a39..822783a174aa 100644 ---- a/kernel/sysctl.c -+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c -@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - #include - #include -@@ -98,12 +99,19 @@ - #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) - - /* External variables not in a header file. */ -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB) -+int deny_new_usb __read_mostly = 0; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL(deny_new_usb); -+#endif - extern int suid_dumpable; - #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP - extern int core_uses_pid; - extern char core_pattern[]; - extern unsigned int core_pipe_limit; - #endif -+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS -+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone; -+#endif - extern int pid_max; - extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max; - extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction; -@@ -115,40 +123,43 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages; - - /* Constants used for minimum and maximum */ - #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR --static int sixty = 60; -+static int sixty __read_only = 60; - #endif - --static int __maybe_unused neg_one = -1; -+static int __maybe_unused neg_one __read_only = -1; - - static int zero; --static int __maybe_unused one = 1; --static int __maybe_unused two = 2; --static int __maybe_unused four = 4; --static unsigned long one_ul = 1; --static int one_hundred = 100; --static int one_thousand = 1000; -+static int __maybe_unused one __read_only = 1; -+static int __maybe_unused two __read_only = 2; -+static int __maybe_unused four __read_only = 4; -+static unsigned long one_ul __read_only = 1; -+static int one_hundred __read_only = 100; -+static int one_thousand __read_only = 1000; - #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK --static int ten_thousand = 10000; -+static int ten_thousand __read_only = 10000; - #endif - #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS --static int six_hundred_forty_kb = 640 * 1024; -+static int six_hundred_forty_kb __read_only = 640 * 1024; - #endif - - /* this is needed for the proc_doulongvec_minmax of vm_dirty_bytes */ --static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min = 2 * PAGE_SIZE; -+static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min __read_only = 2 * PAGE_SIZE; - - /* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for [fs_]overflow UID and GID */ --static int maxolduid = 65535; --static int minolduid; -+static int maxolduid __read_only = 65535; -+static int minolduid __read_only; - --static int ngroups_max = NGROUPS_MAX; -+static int ngroups_max __read_only = NGROUPS_MAX; - static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP; - - /*this is needed for proc_doulongvec_minmax of sysctl_hung_task_timeout_secs */ - #ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK --static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max = (LONG_MAX/HZ); -+static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max __read_only = (LONG_MAX/HZ); - #endif - -+int device_sidechannel_restrict __read_mostly = 1; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL(device_sidechannel_restrict); -+ - #ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER - #include - #endif -@@ -286,19 +297,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = { - }; - - #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG --static int min_sched_granularity_ns = 100000; /* 100 usecs */ --static int max_sched_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */ --static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns; /* 0 usecs */ --static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */ -+static int min_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = 100000; /* 100 usecs */ -+static int max_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */ -+static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only; /* 0 usecs */ -+static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */ - #ifdef CONFIG_SMP --static int min_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE; --static int max_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1; -+static int min_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE; -+static int max_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1; - #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ - #endif /* CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG */ - - #ifdef CONFIG_COMPACTION --static int min_extfrag_threshold; --static int max_extfrag_threshold = 1000; -+static int min_extfrag_threshold __read_only; -+static int max_extfrag_threshold __read_only = 1000; - #endif - - static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { -@@ -512,6 +523,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, - }, - #endif -+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS -+ { -+ .procname = "unprivileged_userns_clone", -+ .data = &unprivileged_userns_clone, -+ .maxlen = sizeof(int), -+ .mode = 0644, -+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, -+ }, -+#endif - #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL - { - .procname = "tainted", -@@ -853,6 +873,37 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { - .extra1 = &zero, - .extra2 = &two, - }, -+#endif -+#if defined CONFIG_TTY -+ { -+ .procname = "tiocsti_restrict", -+ .data = &tiocsti_restrict, -+ .maxlen = sizeof(int), -+ .mode = 0644, -+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, -+ .extra1 = &zero, -+ .extra2 = &one, -+ }, -+#endif -+ { -+ .procname = "device_sidechannel_restrict", -+ .data = &device_sidechannel_restrict, -+ .maxlen = sizeof(int), -+ .mode = 0644, -+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, -+ .extra1 = &zero, -+ .extra2 = &one, -+ }, -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB) -+ { -+ .procname = "deny_new_usb", -+ .data = &deny_new_usb, -+ .maxlen = sizeof(int), -+ .mode = 0644, -+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, -+ .extra1 = &zero, -+ .extra2 = &one, -+ }, - #endif - { - .procname = "ngroups_max", -diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c -index 9fe525f410bf..6a85b0e1292e 100644 ---- a/kernel/time/timer.c -+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c -@@ -1624,7 +1624,7 @@ static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base) - /* - * This function runs timers and the timer-tq in bottom half context. - */ --static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(struct softirq_action *h) -+static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(void) - { - struct timer_base *base = this_cpu_ptr(&timer_bases[BASE_STD]); - -diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c -index c490f1e4313b..dd03bd39d7bf 100644 ---- a/kernel/user_namespace.c -+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c -@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ - #include - #include - -+/* sysctl */ -+int unprivileged_userns_clone; -+ - static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; - static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); - -diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug -index 62d0e25c054c..3953072277eb 100644 ---- a/lib/Kconfig.debug -+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug -@@ -937,6 +937,7 @@ endmenu # "Debug lockups and hangs" - - config PANIC_ON_OOPS - bool "Panic on Oops" -+ default y - help - Say Y here to enable the kernel to panic when it oopses. This - has the same effect as setting oops=panic on the kernel command -@@ -946,7 +947,7 @@ config PANIC_ON_OOPS - anything erroneous after an oops which could result in data - corruption or other issues. - -- Say N if unsure. -+ Say Y if unsure. - - config PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE - int -@@ -1319,6 +1320,7 @@ config DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE - config DEBUG_LIST - bool "Debug linked list manipulation" - depends on DEBUG_KERNEL || BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION -+ default y - help - Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list - walking routines. -@@ -1932,6 +1934,7 @@ config MEMTEST - config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION - bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected" - select DEBUG_LIST -+ default y - help - Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters - data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked -@@ -1952,7 +1955,7 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM - bool "Filter access to /dev/mem" - depends on MMU && DEVMEM - depends on ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED -- default y if TILE || PPC -+ default y - ---help--- - If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to all - of memory, including kernel and userspace memory. Accidental -@@ -1971,6 +1974,7 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM - config IO_STRICT_DEVMEM - bool "Filter I/O access to /dev/mem" - depends on STRICT_DEVMEM -+ default y - ---help--- - If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to all - io-memory regardless of whether a driver is actively using that -diff --git a/lib/irq_poll.c b/lib/irq_poll.c -index 86a709954f5a..6f15787fcb1b 100644 ---- a/lib/irq_poll.c -+++ b/lib/irq_poll.c -@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ void irq_poll_complete(struct irq_poll *iop) - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_poll_complete); - --static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(struct softirq_action *h) -+static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(void) - { - struct list_head *list = this_cpu_ptr(&blk_cpu_iopoll); - int rearm = 0, budget = irq_poll_budget; -diff --git a/lib/kobject.c b/lib/kobject.c -index 34f847252c02..4fda329de614 100644 ---- a/lib/kobject.c -+++ b/lib/kobject.c -@@ -956,9 +956,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kset_create_and_add); - - - static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kobj_ns_type_lock); --static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES]; -+static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES] __ro_after_init; - --int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops) -+int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops) - { - enum kobj_ns_type type = ops->type; - int error; -diff --git a/lib/nlattr.c b/lib/nlattr.c -index 3d8295c85505..3fa3b3409d69 100644 ---- a/lib/nlattr.c -+++ b/lib/nlattr.c -@@ -341,6 +341,8 @@ int nla_memcpy(void *dest, const struct nlattr *src, int count) - { - int minlen = min_t(int, count, nla_len(src)); - -+ BUG_ON(minlen < 0); -+ - memcpy(dest, nla_data(src), minlen); - if (count > minlen) - memset(dest + minlen, 0, count - minlen); -diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c -index 86c3385b9eb3..c482070e379b 100644 ---- a/lib/vsprintf.c -+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c -@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn, - return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec); - } - --int kptr_restrict __read_mostly; -+int kptr_restrict __read_mostly = 2; - - /* - * Show a '%p' thing. A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed -diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig -index 59efbd3337e0..c070e14ec83d 100644 ---- a/mm/Kconfig -+++ b/mm/Kconfig -@@ -319,7 +319,8 @@ config KSM - config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR - int "Low address space to protect from user allocation" - depends on MMU -- default 4096 -+ default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT) -+ default 65536 - help - This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected - from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages -diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c -index 11f96fad5271..632e7f9a710e 100644 ---- a/mm/mmap.c -+++ b/mm/mmap.c -@@ -220,6 +220,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(brk, unsigned long, brk) - - newbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(brk); - oldbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(mm->brk); -+ /* properly handle unaligned min_brk as an empty heap */ -+ if (min_brk & ~PAGE_MASK) { -+ if (brk == min_brk) -+ newbrk -= PAGE_SIZE; -+ if (mm->brk == min_brk) -+ oldbrk -= PAGE_SIZE; -+ } - if (oldbrk == newbrk) - goto set_brk; - -diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c -index 1d7693c35424..8963a3b4d37c 100644 ---- a/mm/page_alloc.c -+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c -@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - #include - #include -@@ -98,6 +99,15 @@ int _node_numa_mem_[MAX_NUMNODES]; - DEFINE_MUTEX(pcpu_drain_mutex); - DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct work_struct, pcpu_drain); - -+bool __meminitdata extra_latent_entropy; -+ -+static int __init setup_extra_latent_entropy(char *str) -+{ -+ extra_latent_entropy = true; -+ return 0; -+} -+early_param("extra_latent_entropy", setup_extra_latent_entropy); -+ - #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY - volatile unsigned long latent_entropy __latent_entropy; - EXPORT_SYMBOL(latent_entropy); -@@ -1063,6 +1073,13 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page, - debug_check_no_obj_freed(page_address(page), - PAGE_SIZE << order); - } -+ -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE)) { -+ int i; -+ for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) -+ clear_highpage(page + i); -+ } -+ - arch_free_page(page, order); - kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 0); - kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 0); -@@ -1278,6 +1295,21 @@ static void __init __free_pages_boot_core(struct page *page, unsigned int order) - __ClearPageReserved(p); - set_page_count(p, 0); - -+ if (extra_latent_entropy && !PageHighMem(page) && page_to_pfn(page) < 0x100000) { -+ unsigned long hash = 0; -+ size_t index, end = PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages / sizeof hash; -+ const unsigned long *data = lowmem_page_address(page); -+ -+ for (index = 0; index < end; index++) -+ hash ^= hash + data[index]; -+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY -+ latent_entropy ^= hash; -+ add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy)); -+#else -+ add_device_randomness((const void *)&hash, sizeof(hash)); -+#endif -+ } -+ - page_zone(page)->managed_pages += nr_pages; - set_page_refcounted(page); - __free_pages(page, order); -@@ -1718,8 +1750,8 @@ static inline int check_new_page(struct page *page) - - static inline bool free_pages_prezeroed(void) - { -- return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) && -- page_poisoning_enabled(); -+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE) || -+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) && page_poisoning_enabled()); - } - - #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM -@@ -1776,6 +1808,11 @@ static void prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags - - post_alloc_hook(page, order, gfp_flags); - -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY)) { -+ for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) -+ verify_zero_highpage(page + i); -+ } -+ - if (!free_pages_prezeroed() && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO)) - for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) - clear_highpage(page + i); -diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h -index 485d9fbb8802..436461588804 100644 ---- a/mm/slab.h -+++ b/mm/slab.h -@@ -311,7 +311,11 @@ static inline bool is_root_cache(struct kmem_cache *s) - static inline bool slab_equal_or_root(struct kmem_cache *s, - struct kmem_cache *p) - { -+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED -+ return p == s; -+#else - return true; -+#endif - } - - static inline const char *cache_name(struct kmem_cache *s) -@@ -363,18 +367,26 @@ static inline struct kmem_cache *cache_from_obj(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x) - * to not do even the assignment. In that case, slab_equal_or_root - * will also be a constant. - */ -- if (!memcg_kmem_enabled() && -+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED) && -+ !memcg_kmem_enabled() && - !unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS)) - return s; - - page = virt_to_head_page(x); -+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED -+ BUG_ON(!PageSlab(page)); -+#endif - cachep = page->slab_cache; - if (slab_equal_or_root(cachep, s)) - return cachep; - - pr_err("%s: Wrong slab cache. %s but object is from %s\n", - __func__, s->name, cachep->name); -+#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION -+ BUG_ON(1); -+#else - WARN_ON_ONCE(1); -+#endif - return s; - } - -@@ -399,7 +411,7 @@ static inline size_t slab_ksize(const struct kmem_cache *s) - * back there or track user information then we can - * only use the space before that information. - */ -- if (s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER)) -+ if ((s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER)) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) - return s->inuse; - /* - * Else we can use all the padding etc for the allocation -diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c -index 65212caa1f2a..d8bf8a75f445 100644 ---- a/mm/slab_common.c -+++ b/mm/slab_common.c -@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ - - #include "slab.h" - --enum slab_state slab_state; -+enum slab_state slab_state __ro_after_init; - LIST_HEAD(slab_caches); - DEFINE_MUTEX(slab_mutex); --struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache; -+struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache __ro_after_init; - - static LIST_HEAD(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy); - static void slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_workfn(struct work_struct *work); -@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work, - /* - * Merge control. If this is set then no merging of slab caches will occur. - */ --static bool slab_nomerge = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT); -+static bool slab_nomerge __ro_after_init = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT); - - static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str) - { -@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_dma_caches); - * of two cache sizes there. The size of larger slabs can be determined using - * fls. - */ --static s8 size_index[24] = { -+static s8 size_index[24] __ro_after_init = { - 3, /* 8 */ - 4, /* 16 */ - 5, /* 24 */ -diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c -index 41c01690d116..591dd60d37f3 100644 ---- a/mm/slub.c -+++ b/mm/slub.c -@@ -125,6 +125,16 @@ static inline int kmem_cache_debug(struct kmem_cache *s) - #endif - } - -+static inline bool has_sanitize(struct kmem_cache *s) -+{ -+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE) && !(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)); -+} -+ -+static inline bool has_sanitize_verify(struct kmem_cache *s) -+{ -+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && has_sanitize(s); -+} -+ - void *fixup_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p) - { - if (kmem_cache_debug(s) && s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) -@@ -297,6 +307,35 @@ static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp) - *(void **)freeptr_addr = freelist_ptr(s, fp, freeptr_addr); - } - -+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY -+static inline unsigned long *get_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) -+{ -+ if (s->offset) -+ return object + s->offset + sizeof(void *); -+ return object + s->inuse; -+} -+ -+static inline unsigned long get_canary_value(const void *canary, unsigned long value) -+{ -+ return (value ^ (unsigned long)canary) & CANARY_MASK; -+} -+ -+static inline void set_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value) -+{ -+ unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object); -+ *canary = get_canary_value(canary, value); -+} -+ -+static inline void check_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value) -+{ -+ unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object); -+ BUG_ON(*canary != get_canary_value(canary, value)); -+} -+#else -+#define set_canary(s, object, value) -+#define check_canary(s, object, value) -+#endif -+ - /* Loop over all objects in a slab */ - #define for_each_object(__p, __s, __addr, __objects) \ - for (__p = fixup_red_left(__s, __addr); \ -@@ -484,13 +523,13 @@ static inline void *restore_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p) - * Debug settings: - */ - #if defined(CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON) --static int slub_debug = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS; -+static int slub_debug __ro_after_init = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS; - #else --static int slub_debug; -+static int slub_debug __ro_after_init; - #endif - --static char *slub_debug_slabs; --static int disable_higher_order_debug; -+static char *slub_debug_slabs __ro_after_init; -+static int disable_higher_order_debug __ro_after_init; - - /* - * slub is about to manipulate internal object metadata. This memory lies -@@ -550,6 +589,9 @@ static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, - else - p = object + s->inuse; - -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) -+ p = (void *)p + sizeof(void *); -+ - return p + alloc; - } - -@@ -688,6 +730,9 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p) - else - off = s->inuse; - -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) -+ off += sizeof(void *); -+ - if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER) - off += 2 * sizeof(struct track); - -@@ -817,6 +862,9 @@ static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p) - /* Freepointer is placed after the object. */ - off += sizeof(void *); - -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) -+ off += sizeof(void *); -+ - if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER) - /* We also have user information there */ - off += 2 * sizeof(struct track); -@@ -1416,8 +1464,9 @@ static void setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, - void *object) - { - setup_object_debug(s, page, object); -+ set_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive); - kasan_init_slab_obj(s, object); -- if (unlikely(s->ctor)) { -+ if (unlikely(s->ctor) && !has_sanitize_verify(s)) { - kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object); - s->ctor(object); - kasan_poison_object_data(s, object); -@@ -2717,9 +2766,21 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, - stat(s, ALLOC_FASTPATH); - } - -- if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object) -+ if (has_sanitize_verify(s) && object) { -+ size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *); -+ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(object + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset)); -+ if (s->ctor) -+ s->ctor(object); -+ if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset) -+ memset(object, 0, sizeof(void *)); -+ } else if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object) - memset(object, 0, s->object_size); - -+ if (object) { -+ check_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive); -+ set_canary(s, object, s->random_active); -+ } -+ - slab_post_alloc_hook(s, gfpflags, 1, &object); - - return object; -@@ -2926,6 +2987,27 @@ static __always_inline void do_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, - void *tail_obj = tail ? : head; - struct kmem_cache_cpu *c; - unsigned long tid; -+ bool sanitize = has_sanitize(s); -+ -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY) || sanitize) { -+ __maybe_unused int offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *); -+ void *x = head; -+ -+ while (1) { -+ check_canary(s, x, s->random_active); -+ set_canary(s, x, s->random_inactive); -+ -+ if (sanitize) { -+ memset(x + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset); -+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && s->ctor) -+ s->ctor(x); -+ } -+ if (x == tail_obj) -+ break; -+ x = get_freepointer(s, x); -+ } -+ } -+ - redo: - /* - * Determine the currently cpus per cpu slab. -@@ -3104,7 +3186,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size, - void **p) - { - struct kmem_cache_cpu *c; -- int i; -+ int i, k; - - /* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */ - s = slab_pre_alloc_hook(s, flags); -@@ -3141,13 +3223,29 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size, - local_irq_enable(); - - /* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled fastpath loop */ -- if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) { -+ if (has_sanitize_verify(s)) { -+ int j; -+ -+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { -+ size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *); -+ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(p[j] + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset)); -+ if (s->ctor) -+ s->ctor(p[j]); -+ if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset) -+ memset(p[j], 0, sizeof(void *)); -+ } -+ } else if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) { - int j; - - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) - memset(p[j], 0, s->object_size); - } - -+ for (k = 0; k < i; k++) { -+ check_canary(s, p[k], s->random_inactive); -+ set_canary(s, p[k], s->random_active); -+ } -+ - /* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */ - slab_post_alloc_hook(s, flags, size, p); - return i; -@@ -3179,9 +3277,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_bulk); - * and increases the number of allocations possible without having to - * take the list_lock. - */ --static int slub_min_order; --static int slub_max_order = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER; --static int slub_min_objects; -+static int slub_min_order __ro_after_init; -+static int slub_max_order __ro_after_init = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER; -+static int slub_min_objects __ro_after_init; - - /* - * Calculate the order of allocation given an slab object size. -@@ -3351,6 +3449,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node) - init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE); - init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n); - #endif -+ set_canary(kmem_cache_node, n, kmem_cache_node->random_active); - kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node), - GFP_KERNEL); - init_kmem_cache_node(n); -@@ -3507,6 +3606,9 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order) - size += sizeof(void *); - } - -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) -+ size += sizeof(void *); -+ - #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG - if (flags & SLAB_STORE_USER) - /* -@@ -3577,6 +3679,10 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, unsigned long flags) - #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED - s->random = get_random_long(); - #endif -+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY -+ s->random_active = get_random_long(); -+ s->random_inactive = get_random_long(); -+#endif - - if (need_reserve_slab_rcu && (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)) - s->reserved = sizeof(struct rcu_head); -@@ -3841,6 +3947,8 @@ const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, - offset -= s->red_left_pad; - } - -+ check_canary(s, (void *)ptr - offset, s->random_active); -+ - /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */ - if (offset <= object_size && n <= object_size - offset) - return NULL; -@@ -3859,7 +3967,11 @@ static size_t __ksize(const void *object) - page = virt_to_head_page(object); - - if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) { -+#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION -+ BUG_ON(!PageCompound(page)); -+#else - WARN_ON(!PageCompound(page)); -+#endif - return PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page); - } - -@@ -4724,7 +4836,7 @@ enum slab_stat_type { - #define SO_TOTAL (1 << SL_TOTAL) - - #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG --static bool memcg_sysfs_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON); -+static bool memcg_sysfs_enabled __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON); - - static int __init setup_slub_memcg_sysfs(char *str) - { -diff --git a/mm/swap.c b/mm/swap.c -index a77d68f2c1b6..d1f1d75f4d1f 100644 ---- a/mm/swap.c -+++ b/mm/swap.c -@@ -92,6 +92,13 @@ static void __put_compound_page(struct page *page) - if (!PageHuge(page)) - __page_cache_release(page); - dtor = get_compound_page_dtor(page); -+ if (!PageHuge(page)) -+ BUG_ON(dtor != free_compound_page -+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE -+ && dtor != free_transhuge_page -+#endif -+ ); -+ - (*dtor)(page); - } - -diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c -index 6ca771f2f25b..6da2c9c3e6a5 100644 ---- a/net/core/dev.c -+++ b/net/core/dev.c -@@ -4095,7 +4095,7 @@ int netif_rx_ni(struct sk_buff *skb) - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(netif_rx_ni); - --static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(struct softirq_action *h) -+static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(void) - { - struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data); - -@@ -5609,7 +5609,7 @@ static int napi_poll(struct napi_struct *n, struct list_head *repoll) - return work; - } - --static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(struct softirq_action *h) -+static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(void) - { - struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data); - unsigned long time_limit = jiffies + -diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig -index f48fe6fc7e8c..d78c52835c08 100644 ---- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig -+++ b/net/ipv4/Kconfig -@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ config IP_PIMSM_V2 - - config SYN_COOKIES - bool "IP: TCP syncookie support" -+ default y - ---help--- - Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN - flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote -diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c -index 54deaa1066cf..211f97bd5ee3 100644 ---- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c -+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c -@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ static int vmlinux_section_warnings = 1; - static int warn_unresolved = 0; - /* How a symbol is exported */ - static int sec_mismatch_count = 0; -+static int writable_fptr_count = 0; - static int sec_mismatch_verbose = 1; - static int sec_mismatch_fatal = 0; - /* ignore missing files */ -@@ -965,6 +966,7 @@ enum mismatch { - ANY_EXIT_TO_ANY_INIT, - EXPORT_TO_INIT_EXIT, - EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT, -+ DATA_TO_TEXT - }; - - /** -@@ -1091,6 +1093,12 @@ static const struct sectioncheck sectioncheck[] = { - .good_tosec = {ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS , NULL}, - .mismatch = EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT, - .handler = extable_mismatch_handler, -+}, -+/* Do not reference code from writable data */ -+{ -+ .fromsec = { DATA_SECTIONS, NULL }, -+ .bad_tosec = { ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS, NULL }, -+ .mismatch = DATA_TO_TEXT - } - }; - -@@ -1240,10 +1248,10 @@ static Elf_Sym *find_elf_symbol(struct elf_info *elf, Elf64_Sword addr, - continue; - if (ELF_ST_TYPE(sym->st_info) == STT_SECTION) - continue; -- if (sym->st_value == addr) -- return sym; - /* Find a symbol nearby - addr are maybe negative */ - d = sym->st_value - addr; -+ if (d == 0) -+ return sym; - if (d < 0) - d = addr - sym->st_value; - if (d < distance) { -@@ -1402,7 +1410,11 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, - char *prl_from; - char *prl_to; - -- sec_mismatch_count++; -+ if (mismatch->mismatch == DATA_TO_TEXT) -+ writable_fptr_count++; -+ else -+ sec_mismatch_count++; -+ - if (!sec_mismatch_verbose) - return; - -@@ -1526,6 +1538,14 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, - fatal("There's a special handler for this mismatch type, " - "we should never get here."); - break; -+ case DATA_TO_TEXT: -+#if 0 -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "The %s %s:%s references\n" -+ "the %s %s:%s%s\n", -+ from, fromsec, fromsym, to, tosec, tosym, to_p); -+#endif -+ break; - } - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - } -@@ -2539,6 +2559,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) - } - } - free(buf.p); -+ if (writable_fptr_count) { -+ if (!sec_mismatch_verbose) { -+ warn("modpost: Found %d writable function pointer(s).\n" -+ "To see full details build your kernel with:\n" -+ "'make CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y'\n", -+ writable_fptr_count); -+ } -+ } - - return err; - } -diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig -index 87f2a6f842fd..7bdbb7edf5bf 100644 ---- a/security/Kconfig -+++ b/security/Kconfig -@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ source security/keys/Kconfig - - config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT - bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" -- default n -+ default y - help - This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel - syslog via dmesg(8). -@@ -18,10 +18,34 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT - - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. - -+config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT -+ bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events" -+ depends on PERF_EVENTS -+ default y -+ help -+ If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl -+ will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the -+ perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is -+ changed. -+ -+config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT -+ bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection" -+ default y -+ help -+ This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands -+ into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI -+ ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. -+ -+ If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced -+ unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). -+ -+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. -+ - config SECURITY - bool "Enable different security models" - depends on SYSFS - depends on MULTIUSER -+ default y - help - This allows you to choose different security modules to be - configured into your kernel. -@@ -48,6 +72,7 @@ config SECURITYFS - config SECURITY_NETWORK - bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" - depends on SECURITY -+ default y - help - This enables the socket and networking security hooks. - If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to -@@ -155,6 +180,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY - depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR - select BUG - imply STRICT_DEVMEM -+ default y - help - This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when - copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and -@@ -178,10 +204,36 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN - config FORTIFY_SOURCE - bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows" - depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE -+ default y - help - Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions - where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes. - -+config FORTIFY_SOURCE_STRICT_STRING -+ bool "Harden common functions against buffer overflows" -+ depends on FORTIFY_SOURCE -+ depends on EXPERT -+ help -+ Perform stricter overflow checks catching overflows within objects -+ for common C string functions rather than only between objects. -+ -+ This is not yet intended for production use, only bug finding. -+ -+config PAGE_SANITIZE -+ bool "Sanitize pages" -+ default y -+ help -+ Zero fill page allocations on free, reducing the lifetime of -+ sensitive data and helping to mitigate use-after-free bugs. -+ -+config PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY -+ bool "Verify sanitized pages" -+ depends on PAGE_SANITIZE -+ default y -+ help -+ Verify that newly allocated pages are zeroed to detect -+ write-after-free bugs. -+ - config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER - bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary" - help -diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig -index 8af7a690eb40..6539694b0fd3 100644 ---- a/security/selinux/Kconfig -+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig -@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX - bool "NSA SELinux Support" - depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET - select NETWORK_SECMARK -- default n -+ default y - help - This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux). - You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem. -@@ -79,23 +79,3 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS - This option collects access vector cache statistics to - /selinux/avc/cache_stats, which may be monitored via - tools such as avcstat. -- --config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE -- int "NSA SELinux checkreqprot default value" -- depends on SECURITY_SELINUX -- range 0 1 -- default 0 -- help -- This option sets the default value for the 'checkreqprot' flag -- that determines whether SELinux checks the protection requested -- by the application or the protection that will be applied by the -- kernel (including any implied execute for read-implies-exec) for -- mmap and mprotect calls. If this option is set to 0 (zero), -- SELinux will default to checking the protection that will be applied -- by the kernel. If this option is set to 1 (one), SELinux will -- default to checking the protection requested by the application. -- The checkreqprot flag may be changed from the default via the -- 'checkreqprot=' boot parameter. It may also be changed at runtime -- via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy. -- -- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0. -diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h -index 1649cd18eb0b..067f35559aa7 100644 ---- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h -+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h -@@ -150,6 +150,6 @@ struct pkey_security_struct { - u32 sid; /* SID of pkey */ - }; - --extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot; -+extern const unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot; - - #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ -diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c -index 00eed842c491..8f7b8d7e6f91 100644 ---- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c -+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c -@@ -41,16 +41,7 @@ - #include "objsec.h" - #include "conditional.h" - --unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; -- --static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) --{ -- unsigned long checkreqprot; -- if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) -- selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; -- return 1; --} --__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup); -+const unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot; - - static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex); - -@@ -610,10 +601,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, - return PTR_ERR(page); - - length = -EINVAL; -- if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1) -+ if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1 || new_value) - goto out; - -- selinux_checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0; - length = count; - out: - kfree(page); -diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig -index 96b27405558a..485c1b85c325 100644 ---- a/security/yama/Kconfig -+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - config SECURITY_YAMA - bool "Yama support" - depends on SECURITY -- default n -+ default y - help - This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional - system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/copperhead-4-16.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/copperhead-4-16.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f0a4bc940347..000000000000 --- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/copperhead-4-16.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2571 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt -index 9824d049367e..6ff72316ff0a 100644 ---- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt -+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt -@@ -496,16 +496,6 @@ - nosocket -- Disable socket memory accounting. - nokmem -- Disable kernel memory accounting. - -- checkreqprot [SELINUX] Set initial checkreqprot flag value. -- Format: { "0" | "1" } -- See security/selinux/Kconfig help text. -- 0 -- check protection applied by kernel (includes -- any implied execute protection). -- 1 -- check protection requested by application. -- Default value is set via a kernel config option. -- Value can be changed at runtime via -- /selinux/checkreqprot. -- - cio_ignore= [S390] - See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details. - clk_ignore_unused -@@ -2946,6 +2936,11 @@ - the specified number of seconds. This is to be used if - your oopses keep scrolling off the screen. - -+ extra_latent_entropy -+ Enable a very simple form of latent entropy extraction -+ from the first 4GB of memory as the bootmem allocator -+ passes the memory pages to the buddy allocator. -+ - pcbit= [HW,ISDN] - - pcd. [PARIDE] -diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile -index ded9e8480d74..2e948bb78142 100644 ---- a/Makefile -+++ b/Makefile -@@ -734,6 +734,9 @@ endif - endif - - ifeq ($(cc-name),clang) -+ifdef CONFIG_LOCAL_INIT -+KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fsanitize=local-init -+endif - KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Qunused-arguments,) - KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, format-invalid-specifier) - KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, gnu) -diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig -index 76c0b54443b1..63a2d30f807f 100644 ---- a/arch/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/Kconfig -@@ -454,6 +454,11 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY - is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and - irq processing. - -+ When extra_latent_entropy is passed on the kernel command line, -+ entropy will be extracted from up to the first 4GB of RAM while the -+ runtime memory allocator is being initialized. This costs even more -+ slowdown of the boot process. -+ - Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically - secure! - -@@ -747,7 +752,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS - int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT - range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX - default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT -- default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN -+ default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX - depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS - help - This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to -@@ -781,7 +786,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS - int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT - range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX - default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT -- default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN -+ default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX - depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS - help - This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to -@@ -968,6 +973,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT - - config REFCOUNT_FULL - bool "Perform full reference count validation at the expense of speed" -+ default y - help - Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast - unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked -diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig -index be665760f2bd..5fb9026c9762 100644 ---- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig -@@ -988,6 +988,7 @@ endif - - config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN - bool "Emulate Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching" -+ default y - help - Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing - user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved -@@ -1141,6 +1142,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE - bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image" - select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES - select RELOCATABLE -+ default y - help - Randomizes the virtual address at which the kernel image is - loaded, as a security feature that deters exploit attempts -diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug -index cc6bd559af85..01d5442d4722 100644 ---- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug -+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug -@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ config ARM64_RANDOMIZE_TEXT_OFFSET - config DEBUG_WX - bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot" - select ARM64_PTDUMP_CORE -+ default y - ---help--- - Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot. - -diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig -index 634b373785c4..5b255a6db6a7 100644 ---- a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig -+++ b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig -@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ --CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y - CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y - CONFIG_AUDIT=y - CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y -diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h -index fac1c4de7898..34786ca166e4 100644 ---- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h -+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h -@@ -114,10 +114,10 @@ - - /* - * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On -- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address -+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address - * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers. - */ --#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3) -+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE 0x100000000UL - - #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ - -@@ -158,10 +158,10 @@ extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, - /* 1GB of VA */ - #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT - #define STACK_RND_MASK (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \ -- 0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \ -- 0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) -+ ((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \ -+ ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) - #else --#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) -+#define STACK_RND_MASK (((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) - #endif - - #ifdef __AARCH64EB__ -diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c -index c0da6efe5465..f308b521c114 100644 ---- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c -+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c -@@ -481,9 +481,9 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp) - unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm) - { - if (is_compat_task()) -- return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_32M); -+ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE; - else -- return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_1G); -+ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE; - } - - /* -diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig -index 0fa71a78ec99..d78d44944374 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig -@@ -1208,8 +1208,7 @@ config VM86 - default X86_LEGACY_VM86 - - config X86_16BIT -- bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments" if EXPERT -- default y -+ bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments" - depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL - ---help--- - This option is required by programs like Wine to run 16-bit -@@ -2299,7 +2298,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO - choice - prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications" - depends on X86_64 -- default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE -+ default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE - help - Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects - to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in -@@ -2380,8 +2379,7 @@ config CMDLINE_OVERRIDE - be set to 'N' under normal conditions. - - config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL -- bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)" if EXPERT -- default y -+ bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)" - ---help--- - Linux can allow user programs to install a per-process x86 - Local Descriptor Table (LDT) using the modify_ldt(2) system -diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug -index 192e4d2f9efc..343c2f1b13da 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug -+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug -@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ config EFI_PGT_DUMP - config DEBUG_WX - bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot" - select X86_PTDUMP_CORE -+ default y - ---help--- - Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot. - -diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig -index e32fc1f274d8..d08acc76502a 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig -+++ b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig -@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ - # CONFIG_LOCALVERSION_AUTO is not set --CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y - CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y - CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT=y - CONFIG_TASKSTATS=y -diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c -index 5b8b556dbb12..a569f08b4478 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c -+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c -@@ -204,55 +204,9 @@ static int map_vdso(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr) - } - - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 --/* -- * Put the vdso above the (randomized) stack with another randomized -- * offset. This way there is no hole in the middle of address space. -- * To save memory make sure it is still in the same PTE as the stack -- * top. This doesn't give that many random bits. -- * -- * Note that this algorithm is imperfect: the distribution of the vdso -- * start address within a PMD is biased toward the end. -- * -- * Only used for the 64-bit and x32 vdsos. -- */ --static unsigned long vdso_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned len) --{ -- unsigned long addr, end; -- unsigned offset; -- -- /* -- * Round up the start address. It can start out unaligned as a result -- * of stack start randomization. -- */ -- start = PAGE_ALIGN(start); -- -- /* Round the lowest possible end address up to a PMD boundary. */ -- end = (start + len + PMD_SIZE - 1) & PMD_MASK; -- if (end >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) -- end = TASK_SIZE_MAX; -- end -= len; -- -- if (end > start) { -- offset = get_random_int() % (((end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1); -- addr = start + (offset << PAGE_SHIFT); -- } else { -- addr = start; -- } -- -- /* -- * Forcibly align the final address in case we have a hardware -- * issue that requires alignment for performance reasons. -- */ -- addr = align_vdso_addr(addr); -- -- return addr; --} -- - static int map_vdso_randomized(const struct vdso_image *image) - { -- unsigned long addr = vdso_addr(current->mm->start_stack, image->size-image->sym_vvar_start); -- -- return map_vdso(image, addr); -+ return map_vdso(image, 0); - } - #endif - -diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h -index 0d157d2a1e2a..770c8ae97f92 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h -@@ -249,11 +249,11 @@ extern int force_personality32; - - /* - * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On -- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address -+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address - * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers. - */ - #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (mmap_is_ia32() ? 0x000400000UL : \ -- (DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW / 3 * 2)) -+ 0x100000000UL) - - /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what - instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space, -@@ -313,8 +313,8 @@ extern bool mmap_address_hint_valid(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len); - - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - --#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) (0x7ff) --#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x7ff) -+#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) -+#define STACK_RND_MASK ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) - - #define ARCH_DLINFO ARCH_DLINFO_IA32 - -@@ -323,7 +323,11 @@ extern bool mmap_address_hint_valid(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len); - #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ - - /* 1GB for 64bit, 8MB for 32bit */ --#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? 0x7ff : 0x3fffff) -+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT -+#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? (1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1 : (1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) -+#else -+#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) -+#endif - #define STACK_RND_MASK __STACK_RND_MASK(mmap_is_ia32()) - - #define ARCH_DLINFO \ -@@ -381,5 +385,4 @@ struct va_alignment { - } ____cacheline_aligned; - - extern struct va_alignment va_align; --extern unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long); - #endif /* _ASM_X86_ELF_H */ -diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h -index 84137c22fdfa..4f197404cab9 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h -@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ static inline void cr4_set_bits(unsigned long mask) - - local_irq_save(flags); - cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); -+ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4()); - if ((cr4 | mask) != cr4) - __cr4_set(cr4 | mask); - local_irq_restore(flags); -@@ -273,6 +274,7 @@ static inline void cr4_clear_bits(unsigned long mask) - - local_irq_save(flags); - cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); -+ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4()); - if ((cr4 & ~mask) != cr4) - __cr4_set(cr4 & ~mask); - local_irq_restore(flags); -@@ -283,6 +285,7 @@ static inline void cr4_toggle_bits_irqsoff(unsigned long mask) - unsigned long cr4; - - cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); -+ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4()); - __cr4_set(cr4 ^ mask); - } - -@@ -389,6 +392,7 @@ static inline void __native_flush_tlb_global(void) - raw_local_irq_save(flags); - - cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4); -+ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4()); - /* toggle PGE */ - native_write_cr4(cr4 ^ X86_CR4_PGE); - /* write old PGE again and flush TLBs */ -diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -index 5f74f94244e1..9c9fdb5ef52e 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -@@ -1662,7 +1662,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) - wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0); - barrier(); - -- x86_configure_nx(); - x2apic_setup(); - - /* -diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c -index 30ca2d1a9231..bde0a18cd9f9 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c -@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include -+#include - - /* - * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux, -@@ -718,7 +720,10 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp) - - unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm) - { -- return randomize_page(mm->brk, 0x02000000); -+ if (mmap_is_ia32()) -+ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE; -+ else -+ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE; - } - - /* -diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c -index 676774b9bb8d..5ad7a95382b0 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c -@@ -54,13 +54,6 @@ static unsigned long get_align_bits(void) - return va_align.bits & get_align_mask(); - } - --unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long addr) --{ -- unsigned long align_mask = get_align_mask(); -- addr = (addr + align_mask) & ~align_mask; -- return addr | get_align_bits(); --} -- - static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str) - { - /* guard against enabling this on other CPU families */ -@@ -122,10 +115,7 @@ static void find_start_end(unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags, - } - - *begin = get_mmap_base(1); -- if (in_compat_syscall()) -- *end = task_size_32bit(); -- else -- *end = task_size_64bit(addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW); -+ *end = get_mmap_base(0); - } - - unsigned long -@@ -210,7 +200,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0, - - info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN; - info.length = len; -- info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE; -+ info.low_limit = get_mmap_base(1); - info.high_limit = get_mmap_base(0); - - /* -diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c -index 396e1f0151ac..6526b19579dc 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c -+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c -@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ static void __init pagetable_init(void) - permanent_kmaps_init(pgd_base); - } - --pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL); -+pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL); - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask); - - /* user-defined highmem size */ -@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ int arch_remove_memory(u64 start, u64 size, struct vmem_altmap *altmap) - #endif - #endif - --int kernel_set_to_readonly __read_mostly; -+int kernel_set_to_readonly __ro_after_init; - - void set_kernel_text_rw(void) - { -@@ -918,12 +918,11 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) - unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text); - unsigned long size = PFN_ALIGN(_etext) - start; - -+ kernel_set_to_readonly = 1; - set_pages_ro(virt_to_page(start), size >> PAGE_SHIFT); - printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel text: %luk\n", - size >> 10); - -- kernel_set_to_readonly = 1; -- - #ifdef CONFIG_CPA_DEBUG - printk(KERN_INFO "Testing CPA: Reverting %lx-%lx\n", - start, start+size); -diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c -index af11a2890235..b2d28d38c01e 100644 ---- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c -+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c -@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ - * around without checking the pgd every time. - */ - --pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0; -+pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~0; - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask); - - int force_personality32; -@@ -1195,7 +1195,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void) - mem_init_print_info(NULL); - } - --int kernel_set_to_readonly; -+int kernel_set_to_readonly __ro_after_init; - - void set_kernel_text_rw(void) - { -@@ -1244,9 +1244,8 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) - - printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel read-only data: %luk\n", - (end - start) >> 10); -- set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT); -- - kernel_set_to_readonly = 1; -+ set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT); - - /* - * The rodata/data/bss/brk section (but not the kernel text!) -diff --git a/block/blk-softirq.c b/block/blk-softirq.c -index 01e2b353a2b9..9aeddca4a29f 100644 ---- a/block/blk-softirq.c -+++ b/block/blk-softirq.c -@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, blk_cpu_done); - * Softirq action handler - move entries to local list and loop over them - * while passing them to the queue registered handler. - */ --static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(struct softirq_action *h) -+static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(void) - { - struct list_head *cpu_list, local_list; - -diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c -index 0df21f046fc6..6f8d9bf71bba 100644 ---- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c -+++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c -@@ -5151,7 +5151,7 @@ void ata_qc_free(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) - struct ata_port *ap; - unsigned int tag; - -- WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */ -+ BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */ - ap = qc->ap; - - qc->flags = 0; -@@ -5168,7 +5168,7 @@ void __ata_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) - struct ata_port *ap; - struct ata_link *link; - -- WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */ -+ BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_ACTIVE)); - ap = qc->ap; - link = qc->dev->link; -diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig -index c28dca0c613d..d4813f0d25ca 100644 ---- a/drivers/char/Kconfig -+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig -@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ source "drivers/tty/Kconfig" - - config DEVMEM - bool "/dev/mem virtual device support" -- default y - help - Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/mem device. - The /dev/mem device is used to access areas of physical -@@ -568,7 +567,6 @@ config TELCLOCK - config DEVPORT - bool "/dev/port character device" - depends on ISA || PCI -- default y - help - Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/port device. The /dev/port - device is similar to /dev/mem, but for I/O ports. -diff --git a/drivers/tty/Kconfig b/drivers/tty/Kconfig -index b811442c5ce6..4f62a63cbcb1 100644 ---- a/drivers/tty/Kconfig -+++ b/drivers/tty/Kconfig -@@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ config UNIX98_PTYS - - config LEGACY_PTYS - bool "Legacy (BSD) PTY support" -- default y - ---help--- - A pseudo terminal (PTY) is a software device consisting of two - halves: a master and a slave. The slave device behaves identical to -diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c -index 83c58a20d16f..32ef2e3a8482 100644 ---- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c -+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c -@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ - #define USB_TP_TRANSMISSION_DELAY 40 /* ns */ - #define USB_TP_TRANSMISSION_DELAY_MAX 65535 /* ns */ - -+extern int deny_new_usb; -+ - /* Protect struct usb_device->state and ->children members - * Note: Both are also protected by ->dev.sem, except that ->state can - * change to USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED even when the semaphore isn't held. */ -@@ -4847,6 +4849,12 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus, - goto done; - return; - } -+ -+ if (deny_new_usb) { -+ dev_err(&port_dev->dev, "denied insert of USB device on port %d\n", port1); -+ goto done; -+ } -+ - if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev)) - unit_load = 150; - else -diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c -index 7eb8d21bcab9..171f31b3bf05 100644 ---- a/fs/exec.c -+++ b/fs/exec.c -@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - #include - #include -@@ -321,6 +322,8 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) - arch_bprm_mm_init(mm, vma); - up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); - bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *); -+ if (randomize_va_space) -+ bprm->p ^= get_random_int() & ~PAGE_MASK; - return 0; - err: - up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); -diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c -index b61d6aa9279d..255c2dc36189 100644 ---- a/fs/namei.c -+++ b/fs/namei.c -@@ -883,8 +883,8 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd) - path_put(&last->link); - } - --int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 0; --int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0; -+int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 1; -+int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1; - - /** - * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations -diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig -index 5f93cfacb3d1..cea0d7d3b23e 100644 ---- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig -+++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig -@@ -195,4 +195,3 @@ config NFS_DEBUG - bool - depends on NFS_FS && SUNRPC_DEBUG - select CRC32 -- default y -diff --git a/fs/proc/Kconfig b/fs/proc/Kconfig -index 1ade1206bb89..60b0f76dec47 100644 ---- a/fs/proc/Kconfig -+++ b/fs/proc/Kconfig -@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ config PROC_KCORE - config PROC_VMCORE - bool "/proc/vmcore support" - depends on PROC_FS && CRASH_DUMP -- default y - help - Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format. - -diff --git a/fs/stat.c b/fs/stat.c -index 873785dae022..d3c2ada8b9c7 100644 ---- a/fs/stat.c -+++ b/fs/stat.c -@@ -40,8 +40,13 @@ void generic_fillattr(struct inode *inode, struct kstat *stat) - stat->gid = inode->i_gid; - stat->rdev = inode->i_rdev; - stat->size = i_size_read(inode); -- stat->atime = inode->i_atime; -- stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime; -+ if (is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) { -+ stat->atime = inode->i_ctime; -+ stat->mtime = inode->i_ctime; -+ } else { -+ stat->atime = inode->i_atime; -+ stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime; -+ } - stat->ctime = inode->i_ctime; - stat->blksize = i_blocksize(inode); - stat->blocks = inode->i_blocks; -@@ -75,9 +80,14 @@ int vfs_getattr_nosec(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, - stat->result_mask |= STATX_BASIC_STATS; - request_mask &= STATX_ALL; - query_flags &= KSTAT_QUERY_FLAGS; -- if (inode->i_op->getattr) -- return inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask, -- query_flags); -+ if (inode->i_op->getattr) { -+ int retval = inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat, request_mask, query_flags); -+ if (!retval && is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) { -+ stat->atime = stat->ctime; -+ stat->mtime = stat->ctime; -+ } -+ return retval; -+ } - - generic_fillattr(inode, stat); - return 0; -diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h -index 750621e41d1c..e7157c18c62c 100644 ---- a/include/linux/cache.h -+++ b/include/linux/cache.h -@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ - #define __ro_after_init __attribute__((__section__(".data..ro_after_init"))) - #endif - -+#define __read_only __ro_after_init -+ - #ifndef ____cacheline_aligned - #define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES))) - #endif -diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h -index f640dcbc880c..2b4f5d651f19 100644 ---- a/include/linux/capability.h -+++ b/include/linux/capability.h -@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap); - extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); - extern bool capable(int cap); -+extern bool capable_noaudit(int cap); - extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); - extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); - #else -@@ -232,6 +233,10 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap) - { - return true; - } -+static inline bool capable_noaudit(int cap) -+{ -+ return true; -+} - static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) - { - return true; -diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h -index c6baf767619e..31904f3d38a6 100644 ---- a/include/linux/fs.h -+++ b/include/linux/fs.h -@@ -3407,4 +3407,15 @@ static inline bool dir_relax_shared(struct inode *inode) - extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path); - extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); - -+extern int device_sidechannel_restrict; -+ -+static inline bool is_sidechannel_device(const struct inode *inode) -+{ -+ umode_t mode; -+ if (!device_sidechannel_restrict) -+ return false; -+ mode = inode->i_mode; -+ return ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && (mode & (S_IROTH | S_IWOTH))); -+} -+ - #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */ -diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h -index bdaf22582f6e..326ff15d4637 100644 ---- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h -+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h -@@ -181,6 +181,9 @@ static inline void fsnotify_access(struct file *file) - struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; - __u32 mask = FS_ACCESS; - -+ if (is_sidechannel_device(inode)) -+ return; -+ - if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) - mask |= FS_ISDIR; - -@@ -199,6 +202,9 @@ static inline void fsnotify_modify(struct file *file) - struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; - __u32 mask = FS_MODIFY; - -+ if (is_sidechannel_device(inode)) -+ return; -+ - if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) - mask |= FS_ISDIR; - -diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h -index 1a4582b44d32..4d445a8fe7f2 100644 ---- a/include/linux/gfp.h -+++ b/include/linux/gfp.h -@@ -513,9 +513,9 @@ extern struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order, - extern unsigned long __get_free_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order); - extern unsigned long get_zeroed_page(gfp_t gfp_mask); - --void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask); -+void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - void free_pages_exact(void *virt, size_t size); --void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask); -+void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - - #define __get_free_page(gfp_mask) \ - __get_free_pages((gfp_mask), 0) -diff --git a/include/linux/highmem.h b/include/linux/highmem.h -index 776f90f3a1cd..3f5c47000059 100644 ---- a/include/linux/highmem.h -+++ b/include/linux/highmem.h -@@ -191,6 +191,13 @@ static inline void clear_highpage(struct page *page) - kunmap_atomic(kaddr); - } - -+static inline void verify_zero_highpage(struct page *page) -+{ -+ void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(page); -+ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE)); -+ kunmap_atomic(kaddr); -+} -+ - static inline void zero_user_segments(struct page *page, - unsigned start1, unsigned end1, - unsigned start2, unsigned end2) -diff --git a/include/linux/interrupt.h b/include/linux/interrupt.h -index 69c238210325..ee487ea4f48f 100644 ---- a/include/linux/interrupt.h -+++ b/include/linux/interrupt.h -@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ extern const char * const softirq_to_name[NR_SOFTIRQS]; - - struct softirq_action - { -- void (*action)(struct softirq_action *); -+ void (*action)(void); - }; - - asmlinkage void do_softirq(void); -@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static inline void do_softirq_own_stack(void) - } - #endif - --extern void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *)); -+extern void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void)); - extern void softirq_init(void); - extern void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr); - -diff --git a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h -index 069aa2ebef90..cb9e3637a620 100644 ---- a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h -+++ b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h -@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct kobj_ns_type_operations { - void (*drop_ns)(void *); - }; - --int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops); -+int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops); - int kobj_ns_type_registered(enum kobj_ns_type type); - const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_child_ns_ops(struct kobject *parent); - const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj); -diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h -index a4e9bdbec490..0fe7ebd0f462 100644 ---- a/include/linux/mm.h -+++ b/include/linux/mm.h -@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static inline int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x) - } - #endif - --extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node); -+extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) - { - return kvmalloc_node(size, flags, NUMA_NO_NODE); -diff --git a/include/linux/percpu.h b/include/linux/percpu.h -index 296bbe49d5d1..b26652c9a98d 100644 ---- a/include/linux/percpu.h -+++ b/include/linux/percpu.h -@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ extern int __init pcpu_page_first_chunk(size_t reserved_size, - pcpu_fc_populate_pte_fn_t populate_pte_fn); - #endif - --extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align); -+extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - extern bool __is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *can_addr); - extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr); - -@@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr); - extern void __init setup_per_cpu_areas(void); - #endif - --extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp); --extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align); -+extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - extern void free_percpu(void __percpu *__pdata); - extern phys_addr_t per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(void *addr); - -diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h -index 7546822a1d74..320033b310d2 100644 ---- a/include/linux/perf_event.h -+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h -@@ -1151,6 +1151,11 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, - int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, - void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); - -+static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void) -+{ -+ return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2; -+} -+ - static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(void) - { - return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1; -diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h -index 231abc8976c5..b0bf5d4a4934 100644 ---- a/include/linux/slab.h -+++ b/include/linux/slab.h -@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ void memcg_destroy_kmem_caches(struct mem_cgroup *); - /* - * Common kmalloc functions provided by all allocators - */ --void * __must_check __krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t); --void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t); -+void * __must_check __krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute__((alloc_size(2))); -+void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute((alloc_size(2))); - void kfree(const void *); - void kzfree(const void *); - size_t ksize(const void *); -@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static __always_inline int kmalloc_index(size_t size) - } - #endif /* !CONFIG_SLOB */ - --void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc; -+void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc; - void kmem_cache_free(struct kmem_cache *, void *); - -@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static __always_inline void kfree_bulk(size_t size, void **p) - } - - #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA --void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc; -+void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc; - #else - static __always_inline void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) -@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ static __always_inline void *kmalloc_large(size_t size, gfp_t flags) - * for general use, and so are not documented here. For a full list of - * potential flags, always refer to linux/gfp.h. - */ --static __always_inline void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) -+static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) - { - if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) { - if (size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE) -@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static __always_inline int kmalloc_size(int n) - return 0; - } - --static __always_inline void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) -+static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) - { - #ifndef CONFIG_SLOB - if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && -diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h -index 8ad99c47b19c..91fea0d0db3b 100644 ---- a/include/linux/slub_def.h -+++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h -@@ -120,6 +120,11 @@ struct kmem_cache { - unsigned long random; - #endif - -+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY -+ unsigned long random_active; -+ unsigned long random_inactive; -+#endif -+ - #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA - /* - * Defragmentation by allocating from a remote node. -diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h -index dd39a690c841..00d16d874c0a 100644 ---- a/include/linux/string.h -+++ b/include/linux/string.h -@@ -235,10 +235,16 @@ void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob - void __read_overflow3(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 3rd parameter"); - void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter"); - -+#ifdef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE_STRICT_STRING -+#define __string_size(p) __builtin_object_size(p, 1) -+#else -+#define __string_size(p) __builtin_object_size(p, 0) -+#endif -+ - #if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) - __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) - { -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); - if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size) - __write_overflow(); - if (p_size < size) -@@ -248,7 +254,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) - - __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q) - { -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); - if (p_size == (size_t)-1) - return __builtin_strcat(p, q); - if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size) -@@ -259,7 +265,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q) - __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p) - { - __kernel_size_t ret; -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); - - /* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */ - if (p_size == (size_t)-1 || -@@ -274,7 +280,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p) - extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen); - __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *p, __kernel_size_t maxlen) - { -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); - __kernel_size_t ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size); - if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret) - fortify_panic(__func__); -@@ -286,8 +292,8 @@ extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy); - __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size) - { - size_t ret; -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); -+ size_t q_size = __string_size(q); - if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) - return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size); - ret = strlen(q); -@@ -307,8 +313,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size) - __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) - { - size_t p_len, copy_len; -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); -+ size_t q_size = __string_size(q); - if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) - return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count); - p_len = strlen(p); -@@ -421,8 +427,8 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) - /* defined after fortified strlen and memcpy to reuse them */ - __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q) - { -- size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); -- size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); -+ size_t p_size = __string_size(p); -+ size_t q_size = __string_size(q); - if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) - return __builtin_strcpy(p, q); - memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1); -diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h -index 1e5d8c392f15..66d0e49c9987 100644 ---- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h -+++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h -@@ -68,19 +68,19 @@ static inline void vmalloc_init(void) - } - #endif - --extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size); --extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size); --extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size); --extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node); --extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node); --extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size); --extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size); --extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size); --extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot); -+extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); -+extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - extern void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align, - unsigned long start, unsigned long end, gfp_t gfp_mask, - pgprot_t prot, unsigned long vm_flags, int node, -- const void *caller); -+ const void *caller) __attribute__((alloc_size(1))); - #ifndef CONFIG_MMU - extern void *__vmalloc_node_flags(unsigned long size, int node, gfp_t flags); - static inline void *__vmalloc_node_flags_caller(unsigned long size, int node, -diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig -index e37f4b2a6445..49c20dea1afd 100644 ---- a/init/Kconfig -+++ b/init/Kconfig -@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ config USELIB - config AUDIT - bool "Auditing support" - depends on NET -+ default y - help - Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another - kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for -@@ -1039,6 +1040,12 @@ config CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE - - endchoice - -+config LOCAL_INIT -+ bool "Zero uninitialized locals" -+ help -+ Zero-fill uninitialized local variables, other than variable-length -+ arrays. Requires compiler support. -+ - config SYSCTL - bool - -@@ -1296,8 +1303,7 @@ config SHMEM - which may be appropriate on small systems without swap. - - config AIO -- bool "Enable AIO support" if EXPERT -- default y -+ bool "Enable AIO support" - help - This option enables POSIX asynchronous I/O which may by used - by some high performance threaded applications. Disabling -@@ -1502,7 +1508,7 @@ config VM_EVENT_COUNTERS - - config SLUB_DEBUG - default y -- bool "Enable SLUB debugging support" if EXPERT -+ bool "Enable SLUB debugging support" - depends on SLUB && SYSFS - help - SLUB has extensive debug support features. Disabling these can -@@ -1526,7 +1532,6 @@ config SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON - - config COMPAT_BRK - bool "Disable heap randomization" -- default y - help - Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it - also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based). -@@ -1573,7 +1578,6 @@ endchoice - - config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT - bool "Allow slab caches to be merged" -- default y - help - For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be - merged when they share the same size and other characteristics. -@@ -1586,9 +1590,9 @@ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT - command line. - - config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM -- default n - depends on SLAB || SLUB - bool "SLAB freelist randomization" -+ default y - help - Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This - security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab -@@ -1597,12 +1601,56 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM - config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED - bool "Harden slab freelist metadata" - depends on SLUB -+ default y - help - Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and - other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance - sacrifies to harden the kernel slab allocator against common - freelist exploit methods. - -+config SLAB_HARDENED -+ default y -+ depends on SLUB -+ bool "Hardened SLAB infrastructure" -+ help -+ Make minor performance sacrifices to harden the kernel slab -+ allocator. -+ -+config SLAB_CANARY -+ depends on SLUB -+ depends on !SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT -+ bool "SLAB canaries" -+ default y -+ help -+ Place canaries at the end of kernel slab allocations, sacrificing -+ some performance and memory usage for security. -+ -+ Canaries can detect some forms of heap corruption when allocations -+ are freed and as part of the HARDENED_USERCOPY feature. It provides -+ basic use-after-free detection for HARDENED_USERCOPY. -+ -+ Canaries absorb small overflows (rendering them harmless), mitigate -+ non-NUL terminated C string overflows on 64-bit via a guaranteed zero -+ byte and provide basic double-free detection. -+ -+config SLAB_SANITIZE -+ bool "Sanitize SLAB allocations" -+ depends on SLUB -+ default y -+ help -+ Zero fill slab allocations on free, reducing the lifetime of -+ sensitive data and helping to mitigate use-after-free bugs. -+ -+ For slabs with debug poisoning enabling, this has no impact. -+ -+config SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY -+ depends on SLAB_SANITIZE && PAGE_SANITIZE -+ default y -+ bool "Verify sanitized SLAB allocations" -+ help -+ Verify that newly allocated slab allocations are zeroed to detect -+ write-after-free bugs. -+ - config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL - default y - depends on SLUB && SMP -diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c -index 227db99b0f19..aec52b408543 100644 ---- a/kernel/audit.c -+++ b/kernel/audit.c -@@ -1578,6 +1578,9 @@ static int __init audit_enable(char *str) - - if (audit_default == AUDIT_OFF) - audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED; -+ else if (!audit_ever_enabled) -+ audit_initialized = AUDIT_UNINITIALIZED; -+ - if (audit_set_enabled(audit_default)) - panic("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n", audit_default); - -diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c -index ba03ec39efb3..47ed9081b668 100644 ---- a/kernel/bpf/core.c -+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c -@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_single(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, - #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT - /* All BPF JIT sysctl knobs here. */ - int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON); --int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly; -+int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly = 2; - int bpf_jit_kallsyms __read_mostly; - - static __always_inline void -diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c -index 43f95d190eea..8e353f596873 100644 ---- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c -+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c -@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(prog_idr_lock); - static DEFINE_IDR(map_idr); - static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(map_idr_lock); - --int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly; -+int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly = 1; - - static const struct bpf_map_ops * const bpf_map_types[] = { - #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _ops) -diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c -index 1e1c0236f55b..452062fe45ce 100644 ---- a/kernel/capability.c -+++ b/kernel/capability.c -@@ -431,6 +431,12 @@ bool capable(int cap) - return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap); - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); -+ -+bool capable_noaudit(int cap) -+{ -+ return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, cap); -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_noaudit); - #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ - - /** -diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c -index ca7298760c83..910ac6cc9f07 100644 ---- a/kernel/events/core.c -+++ b/kernel/events/core.c -@@ -397,8 +397,13 @@ static cpumask_var_t perf_online_mask; - * 0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv - * 1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv - * 2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv -+ * 3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use - */ -+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT -+int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3; -+#else - int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2; -+#endif - - /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */ - int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */ -@@ -9921,6 +9926,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, - if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL) - return -EINVAL; - -+ if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) -+ return -EACCES; -+ - err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr); - if (err) - return err; -diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c -index e5d9d405ae4e..c4be89c51f25 100644 ---- a/kernel/fork.c -+++ b/kernel/fork.c -@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ - - #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS - #include -+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS -+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone; -+#else -+#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0 -+#endif - - /* - * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel -@@ -1591,6 +1596,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( - if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - -+ if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) -+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); -+ - /* - * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads - * can only be started up within the thread group. -@@ -2385,6 +2394,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags) - if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS) - unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS; - -+ if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) { -+ err = -EPERM; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) -+ goto bad_unshare_out; -+ } -+ - err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags); - if (err) - goto bad_unshare_out; -diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c -index 3d37c279c090..0789ca413f09 100644 ---- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c -+++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c -@@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@ void free_basic_memory_bitmaps(void) - - void clear_free_pages(void) - { --#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO -+#if defined(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) || defined(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE) - struct memory_bitmap *bm = free_pages_map; - unsigned long pfn; - -@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ void clear_free_pages(void) - } - memory_bm_position_reset(bm); - pr_info("free pages cleared after restore\n"); --#endif /* PAGE_POISONING_ZERO */ -+#endif /* PAGE_POISONING_ZERO || PAGE_SANITIZE */ - } - - /** -diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c -index a64eee0db39e..4d7de378fe4c 100644 ---- a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c -+++ b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c -@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static void __rcu_process_callbacks(struct rcu_ctrlblk *rcp) - } - } - --static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused) -+static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void) - { - __rcu_process_callbacks(&rcu_sched_ctrlblk); - __rcu_process_callbacks(&rcu_bh_ctrlblk); -diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree.c b/kernel/rcu/tree.c -index 491bdf39f276..28f51c774671 100644 ---- a/kernel/rcu/tree.c -+++ b/kernel/rcu/tree.c -@@ -2906,7 +2906,7 @@ __rcu_process_callbacks(struct rcu_state *rsp) - /* - * Do RCU core processing for the current CPU. - */ --static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused) -+static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void) - { - struct rcu_state *rsp; - -diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c -index 5eb3ffc9be84..a60c59cbbaee 100644 ---- a/kernel/sched/fair.c -+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c -@@ -9387,7 +9387,7 @@ static void nohz_idle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, enum cpu_idle_type idle) { } - * run_rebalance_domains is triggered when needed from the scheduler tick. - * Also triggered for nohz idle balancing (with nohz_balancing_kick set). - */ --static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(struct softirq_action *h) -+static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(void) - { - struct rq *this_rq = this_rq(); - enum cpu_idle_type idle = this_rq->idle_balance ? -diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c -index 24d243ef8e71..4ed8a162cd70 100644 ---- a/kernel/softirq.c -+++ b/kernel/softirq.c -@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ irq_cpustat_t irq_stat[NR_CPUS] ____cacheline_aligned; - EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_stat); - #endif - --static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __cacheline_aligned_in_smp; -+static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __ro_after_init __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); - - DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, ksoftirqd); - -@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void) - kstat_incr_softirqs_this_cpu(vec_nr); - - trace_softirq_entry(vec_nr); -- h->action(h); -+ h->action(); - trace_softirq_exit(vec_nr); - if (unlikely(prev_count != preempt_count())) { - pr_err("huh, entered softirq %u %s %p with preempt_count %08x, exited with %08x?\n", -@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr) - or_softirq_pending(1UL << nr); - } - --void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *)) -+void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void)) - { - softirq_vec[nr].action = action; - } -@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ void __tasklet_hi_schedule(struct tasklet_struct *t) - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tasklet_hi_schedule); - --static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a) -+static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(void) - { - struct tasklet_struct *list; - -@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a) - } - } - --static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(struct softirq_action *a) -+static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(void) - { - struct tasklet_struct *list; - -diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c -index f98f28c12020..861e8b721161 100644 ---- a/kernel/sysctl.c -+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c -@@ -99,12 +99,19 @@ - #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) - - /* External variables not in a header file. */ -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB) -+int deny_new_usb __read_mostly = 0; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL(deny_new_usb); -+#endif - extern int suid_dumpable; - #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP - extern int core_uses_pid; - extern char core_pattern[]; - extern unsigned int core_pipe_limit; - #endif -+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS -+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone; -+#endif - extern int pid_max; - extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max; - extern int percpu_pagelist_fraction; -@@ -116,40 +123,43 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages; - - /* Constants used for minimum and maximum */ - #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR --static int sixty = 60; -+static int sixty __read_only = 60; - #endif - --static int __maybe_unused neg_one = -1; -+static int __maybe_unused neg_one __read_only = -1; - - static int zero; --static int __maybe_unused one = 1; --static int __maybe_unused two = 2; --static int __maybe_unused four = 4; --static unsigned long one_ul = 1; --static int one_hundred = 100; --static int one_thousand = 1000; -+static int __maybe_unused one __read_only = 1; -+static int __maybe_unused two __read_only = 2; -+static int __maybe_unused four __read_only = 4; -+static unsigned long one_ul __read_only = 1; -+static int one_hundred __read_only = 100; -+static int one_thousand __read_only = 1000; - #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK --static int ten_thousand = 10000; -+static int ten_thousand __read_only = 10000; - #endif - #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS --static int six_hundred_forty_kb = 640 * 1024; -+static int six_hundred_forty_kb __read_only = 640 * 1024; - #endif - - /* this is needed for the proc_doulongvec_minmax of vm_dirty_bytes */ --static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min = 2 * PAGE_SIZE; -+static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min __read_only = 2 * PAGE_SIZE; - - /* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for [fs_]overflow UID and GID */ --static int maxolduid = 65535; --static int minolduid; -+static int maxolduid __read_only = 65535; -+static int minolduid __read_only; - --static int ngroups_max = NGROUPS_MAX; -+static int ngroups_max __read_only = NGROUPS_MAX; - static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP; - - /*this is needed for proc_doulongvec_minmax of sysctl_hung_task_timeout_secs */ - #ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK --static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max = (LONG_MAX/HZ); -+static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max __read_only = (LONG_MAX/HZ); - #endif - -+int device_sidechannel_restrict __read_mostly = 1; -+EXPORT_SYMBOL(device_sidechannel_restrict); -+ - #ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER - #include - #endif -@@ -289,19 +299,19 @@ static struct ctl_table sysctl_base_table[] = { - }; - - #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG --static int min_sched_granularity_ns = 100000; /* 100 usecs */ --static int max_sched_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */ --static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns; /* 0 usecs */ --static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */ -+static int min_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = 100000; /* 100 usecs */ -+static int max_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */ -+static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only; /* 0 usecs */ -+static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */ - #ifdef CONFIG_SMP --static int min_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE; --static int max_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1; -+static int min_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE; -+static int max_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1; - #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ - #endif /* CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG */ - - #ifdef CONFIG_COMPACTION --static int min_extfrag_threshold; --static int max_extfrag_threshold = 1000; -+static int min_extfrag_threshold __read_only; -+static int max_extfrag_threshold __read_only = 1000; - #endif - - static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { -@@ -515,6 +525,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, - }, - #endif -+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS -+ { -+ .procname = "unprivileged_userns_clone", -+ .data = &unprivileged_userns_clone, -+ .maxlen = sizeof(int), -+ .mode = 0644, -+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, -+ }, -+#endif - #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL - { - .procname = "tainted", -@@ -856,6 +875,26 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { - .extra1 = &zero, - .extra2 = &two, - }, -+#endif -+ { -+ .procname = "device_sidechannel_restrict", -+ .data = &device_sidechannel_restrict, -+ .maxlen = sizeof(int), -+ .mode = 0644, -+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, -+ .extra1 = &zero, -+ .extra2 = &one, -+ }, -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB) -+ { -+ .procname = "deny_new_usb", -+ .data = &deny_new_usb, -+ .maxlen = sizeof(int), -+ .mode = 0644, -+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, -+ .extra1 = &zero, -+ .extra2 = &one, -+ }, - #endif - { - .procname = "ngroups_max", -diff --git a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c -index 23788100e214..5577a58d1c7a 100644 ---- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c -+++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c -@@ -1413,7 +1413,7 @@ static void __hrtimer_run_queues(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base, ktime_t now, - } - } - --static __latent_entropy void hrtimer_run_softirq(struct softirq_action *h) -+static __latent_entropy void hrtimer_run_softirq(void) - { - struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base = this_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases); - unsigned long flags; -diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c -index 4a4fd567fb26..be236ef42690 100644 ---- a/kernel/time/timer.c -+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c -@@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base) - /* - * This function runs timers and the timer-tq in bottom half context. - */ --static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(struct softirq_action *h) -+static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(void) - { - struct timer_base *base = this_cpu_ptr(&timer_bases[BASE_STD]); - -diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c -index 246d4d4ce5c7..f64432b45cec 100644 ---- a/kernel/user_namespace.c -+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c -@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ - #include - #include - -+/* sysctl */ -+int unprivileged_userns_clone; -+ - static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; - static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); - -diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug -index 64155e310a9f..0c002bbb8f75 100644 ---- a/lib/Kconfig.debug -+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug -@@ -945,6 +945,7 @@ endmenu # "Debug lockups and hangs" - - config PANIC_ON_OOPS - bool "Panic on Oops" -+ default y - help - Say Y here to enable the kernel to panic when it oopses. This - has the same effect as setting oops=panic on the kernel command -@@ -954,7 +955,7 @@ config PANIC_ON_OOPS - anything erroneous after an oops which could result in data - corruption or other issues. - -- Say N if unsure. -+ Say Y if unsure. - - config PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE - int -@@ -1309,6 +1310,7 @@ config DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE - config DEBUG_LIST - bool "Debug linked list manipulation" - depends on DEBUG_KERNEL || BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION -+ default y - help - Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list - walking routines. -@@ -1949,6 +1951,7 @@ config MEMTEST - config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION - bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected" - select DEBUG_LIST -+ default y - help - Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters - data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked -@@ -1988,6 +1991,7 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM - config IO_STRICT_DEVMEM - bool "Filter I/O access to /dev/mem" - depends on STRICT_DEVMEM -+ default y - ---help--- - If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to all - io-memory regardless of whether a driver is actively using that -diff --git a/lib/irq_poll.c b/lib/irq_poll.c -index 86a709954f5a..6f15787fcb1b 100644 ---- a/lib/irq_poll.c -+++ b/lib/irq_poll.c -@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ void irq_poll_complete(struct irq_poll *iop) - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_poll_complete); - --static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(struct softirq_action *h) -+static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(void) - { - struct list_head *list = this_cpu_ptr(&blk_cpu_iopoll); - int rearm = 0, budget = irq_poll_budget; -diff --git a/lib/kobject.c b/lib/kobject.c -index d20a97a7e168..7afe7fcfa6c9 100644 ---- a/lib/kobject.c -+++ b/lib/kobject.c -@@ -954,9 +954,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kset_create_and_add); - - - static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kobj_ns_type_lock); --static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES]; -+static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES] __ro_after_init; - --int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops) -+int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops) - { - enum kobj_ns_type type = ops->type; - int error; -diff --git a/lib/nlattr.c b/lib/nlattr.c -index dfa55c873c13..c6b0436f473d 100644 ---- a/lib/nlattr.c -+++ b/lib/nlattr.c -@@ -364,6 +364,8 @@ int nla_memcpy(void *dest, const struct nlattr *src, int count) - { - int minlen = min_t(int, count, nla_len(src)); - -+ BUG_ON(minlen < 0); -+ - memcpy(dest, nla_data(src), minlen); - if (count > minlen) - memset(dest + minlen, 0, count - minlen); -diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c -index 38b509cc6b46..6b3bf13d57d6 100644 ---- a/lib/vsprintf.c -+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c -@@ -1344,7 +1344,7 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr, - return string(buf, end, uuid, spec); - } - --int kptr_restrict __read_mostly; -+int kptr_restrict __read_mostly = 2; - - static noinline_for_stack - char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, -diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig -index e07608f64d47..18937911b87a 100644 ---- a/mm/Kconfig -+++ b/mm/Kconfig -@@ -319,7 +319,8 @@ config KSM - config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR - int "Low address space to protect from user allocation" - depends on MMU -- default 4096 -+ default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT) -+ default 65536 - help - This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected - from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages -diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c -index 03ca089cce0f..9bf52aa6b042 100644 ---- a/mm/mmap.c -+++ b/mm/mmap.c -@@ -220,6 +220,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(brk, unsigned long, brk) - - newbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(brk); - oldbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(mm->brk); -+ /* properly handle unaligned min_brk as an empty heap */ -+ if (min_brk & ~PAGE_MASK) { -+ if (brk == min_brk) -+ newbrk -= PAGE_SIZE; -+ if (mm->brk == min_brk) -+ oldbrk -= PAGE_SIZE; -+ } - if (oldbrk == newbrk) - goto set_brk; - -diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c -index 1741dd23e7c1..462ce9910e43 100644 ---- a/mm/page_alloc.c -+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c -@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - #include - #include -@@ -101,6 +102,15 @@ int _node_numa_mem_[MAX_NUMNODES]; - DEFINE_MUTEX(pcpu_drain_mutex); - DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct work_struct, pcpu_drain); - -+bool __meminitdata extra_latent_entropy; -+ -+static int __init setup_extra_latent_entropy(char *str) -+{ -+ extra_latent_entropy = true; -+ return 0; -+} -+early_param("extra_latent_entropy", setup_extra_latent_entropy); -+ - #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY - volatile unsigned long latent_entropy __latent_entropy; - EXPORT_SYMBOL(latent_entropy); -@@ -1069,6 +1079,13 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page, - debug_check_no_obj_freed(page_address(page), - PAGE_SIZE << order); - } -+ -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE)) { -+ int i; -+ for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) -+ clear_highpage(page + i); -+ } -+ - arch_free_page(page, order); - kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 0); - kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 0); -@@ -1286,6 +1303,21 @@ static void __init __free_pages_boot_core(struct page *page, unsigned int order) - __ClearPageReserved(p); - set_page_count(p, 0); - -+ if (extra_latent_entropy && !PageHighMem(page) && page_to_pfn(page) < 0x100000) { -+ unsigned long hash = 0; -+ size_t index, end = PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages / sizeof hash; -+ const unsigned long *data = lowmem_page_address(page); -+ -+ for (index = 0; index < end; index++) -+ hash ^= hash + data[index]; -+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY -+ latent_entropy ^= hash; -+ add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy)); -+#else -+ add_device_randomness((const void *)&hash, sizeof(hash)); -+#endif -+ } -+ - page_zone(page)->managed_pages += nr_pages; - set_page_refcounted(page); - __free_pages(page, order); -@@ -1754,8 +1786,8 @@ static inline int check_new_page(struct page *page) - - static inline bool free_pages_prezeroed(void) - { -- return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) && -- page_poisoning_enabled(); -+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE) || -+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) && page_poisoning_enabled()); - } - - #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM -@@ -1812,6 +1844,11 @@ static void prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags - - post_alloc_hook(page, order, gfp_flags); - -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY)) { -+ for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) -+ verify_zero_highpage(page + i); -+ } -+ - if (!free_pages_prezeroed() && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO)) - for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) - clear_highpage(page + i); -diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h -index 51813236e773..e0d1b194a454 100644 ---- a/mm/slab.h -+++ b/mm/slab.h -@@ -312,7 +312,11 @@ static inline bool is_root_cache(struct kmem_cache *s) - static inline bool slab_equal_or_root(struct kmem_cache *s, - struct kmem_cache *p) - { -+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED -+ return p == s; -+#else - return true; -+#endif - } - - static inline const char *cache_name(struct kmem_cache *s) -@@ -364,18 +368,26 @@ static inline struct kmem_cache *cache_from_obj(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x) - * to not do even the assignment. In that case, slab_equal_or_root - * will also be a constant. - */ -- if (!memcg_kmem_enabled() && -+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED) && -+ !memcg_kmem_enabled() && - !unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS)) - return s; - - page = virt_to_head_page(x); -+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_HARDENED -+ BUG_ON(!PageSlab(page)); -+#endif - cachep = page->slab_cache; - if (slab_equal_or_root(cachep, s)) - return cachep; - - pr_err("%s: Wrong slab cache. %s but object is from %s\n", - __func__, s->name, cachep->name); -+#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION -+ BUG_ON(1); -+#else - WARN_ON_ONCE(1); -+#endif - return s; - } - -@@ -400,7 +412,7 @@ static inline size_t slab_ksize(const struct kmem_cache *s) - * back there or track user information then we can - * only use the space before that information. - */ -- if (s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER)) -+ if ((s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER)) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) - return s->inuse; - /* - * Else we can use all the padding etc for the allocation -diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c -index 10f127b2de7c..3637ef72c5b4 100644 ---- a/mm/slab_common.c -+++ b/mm/slab_common.c -@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ - - #include "slab.h" - --enum slab_state slab_state; -+enum slab_state slab_state __ro_after_init; - LIST_HEAD(slab_caches); - DEFINE_MUTEX(slab_mutex); --struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache; -+struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache __ro_after_init; - - #ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY - bool usercopy_fallback __ro_after_init = -@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work, - /* - * Merge control. If this is set then no merging of slab caches will occur. - */ --static bool slab_nomerge = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT); -+static bool slab_nomerge __ro_after_init = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT); - - static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str) - { -@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_dma_caches); - * of two cache sizes there. The size of larger slabs can be determined using - * fls. - */ --static s8 size_index[24] = { -+static s8 size_index[24] __ro_after_init = { - 3, /* 8 */ - 4, /* 16 */ - 5, /* 24 */ -diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c -index e381728a3751..76dd844d978a 100644 ---- a/mm/slub.c -+++ b/mm/slub.c -@@ -125,6 +125,16 @@ static inline int kmem_cache_debug(struct kmem_cache *s) - #endif - } - -+static inline bool has_sanitize(struct kmem_cache *s) -+{ -+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE) && !(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)); -+} -+ -+static inline bool has_sanitize_verify(struct kmem_cache *s) -+{ -+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && has_sanitize(s); -+} -+ - void *fixup_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p) - { - if (kmem_cache_debug(s) && s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) -@@ -299,6 +309,35 @@ static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp) - *(void **)freeptr_addr = freelist_ptr(s, fp, freeptr_addr); - } - -+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY -+static inline unsigned long *get_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) -+{ -+ if (s->offset) -+ return object + s->offset + sizeof(void *); -+ return object + s->inuse; -+} -+ -+static inline unsigned long get_canary_value(const void *canary, unsigned long value) -+{ -+ return (value ^ (unsigned long)canary) & CANARY_MASK; -+} -+ -+static inline void set_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value) -+{ -+ unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object); -+ *canary = get_canary_value(canary, value); -+} -+ -+static inline void check_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value) -+{ -+ unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object); -+ BUG_ON(*canary != get_canary_value(canary, value)); -+} -+#else -+#define set_canary(s, object, value) -+#define check_canary(s, object, value) -+#endif -+ - /* Loop over all objects in a slab */ - #define for_each_object(__p, __s, __addr, __objects) \ - for (__p = fixup_red_left(__s, __addr); \ -@@ -486,13 +525,13 @@ static inline void *restore_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p) - * Debug settings: - */ - #if defined(CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON) --static slab_flags_t slub_debug = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS; -+static slab_flags_t slub_debug __ro_after_init = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS; - #else --static slab_flags_t slub_debug; -+static slab_flags_t slub_debug __ro_after_init; - #endif - --static char *slub_debug_slabs; --static int disable_higher_order_debug; -+static char *slub_debug_slabs __ro_after_init; -+static int disable_higher_order_debug __ro_after_init; - - /* - * slub is about to manipulate internal object metadata. This memory lies -@@ -552,6 +591,9 @@ static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, - else - p = object + s->inuse; - -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) -+ p = (void *)p + sizeof(void *); -+ - return p + alloc; - } - -@@ -690,6 +732,9 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p) - else - off = s->inuse; - -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) -+ off += sizeof(void *); -+ - if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER) - off += 2 * sizeof(struct track); - -@@ -819,6 +864,9 @@ static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p) - /* Freepointer is placed after the object. */ - off += sizeof(void *); - -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) -+ off += sizeof(void *); -+ - if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER) - /* We also have user information there */ - off += 2 * sizeof(struct track); -@@ -1420,8 +1468,9 @@ static void setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, - void *object) - { - setup_object_debug(s, page, object); -+ set_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive); - kasan_init_slab_obj(s, object); -- if (unlikely(s->ctor)) { -+ if (unlikely(s->ctor) && !has_sanitize_verify(s)) { - kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object); - s->ctor(object); - kasan_poison_object_data(s, object); -@@ -2719,9 +2768,21 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, - stat(s, ALLOC_FASTPATH); - } - -- if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object) -+ if (has_sanitize_verify(s) && object) { -+ size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *); -+ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(object + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset)); -+ if (s->ctor) -+ s->ctor(object); -+ if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset) -+ memset(object, 0, sizeof(void *)); -+ } else if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object) - memset(object, 0, s->object_size); - -+ if (object) { -+ check_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive); -+ set_canary(s, object, s->random_active); -+ } -+ - slab_post_alloc_hook(s, gfpflags, 1, &object); - - return object; -@@ -2928,6 +2989,27 @@ static __always_inline void do_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, - void *tail_obj = tail ? : head; - struct kmem_cache_cpu *c; - unsigned long tid; -+ bool sanitize = has_sanitize(s); -+ -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY) || sanitize) { -+ __maybe_unused int offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *); -+ void *x = head; -+ -+ while (1) { -+ check_canary(s, x, s->random_active); -+ set_canary(s, x, s->random_inactive); -+ -+ if (sanitize) { -+ memset(x + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset); -+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && s->ctor) -+ s->ctor(x); -+ } -+ if (x == tail_obj) -+ break; -+ x = get_freepointer(s, x); -+ } -+ } -+ - redo: - /* - * Determine the currently cpus per cpu slab. -@@ -3106,7 +3188,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size, - void **p) - { - struct kmem_cache_cpu *c; -- int i; -+ int i, k; - - /* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */ - s = slab_pre_alloc_hook(s, flags); -@@ -3143,13 +3225,29 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size, - local_irq_enable(); - - /* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled fastpath loop */ -- if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) { -+ if (has_sanitize_verify(s)) { -+ int j; -+ -+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { -+ size_t offset = s->offset ? 0 : sizeof(void *); -+ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(p[j] + offset, 0, s->object_size - offset)); -+ if (s->ctor) -+ s->ctor(p[j]); -+ if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && offset) -+ memset(p[j], 0, sizeof(void *)); -+ } -+ } else if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) { - int j; - - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) - memset(p[j], 0, s->object_size); - } - -+ for (k = 0; k < i; k++) { -+ check_canary(s, p[k], s->random_inactive); -+ set_canary(s, p[k], s->random_active); -+ } -+ - /* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */ - slab_post_alloc_hook(s, flags, size, p); - return i; -@@ -3181,9 +3279,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_bulk); - * and increases the number of allocations possible without having to - * take the list_lock. - */ --static int slub_min_order; --static int slub_max_order = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER; --static int slub_min_objects; -+static int slub_min_order __ro_after_init; -+static int slub_max_order __ro_after_init = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER; -+static int slub_min_objects __ro_after_init; - - /* - * Calculate the order of allocation given an slab object size. -@@ -3353,6 +3451,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node) - init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE); - init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n); - #endif -+ set_canary(kmem_cache_node, n, kmem_cache_node->random_active); - kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node), - GFP_KERNEL); - init_kmem_cache_node(n); -@@ -3509,6 +3608,9 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order) - size += sizeof(void *); - } - -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)) -+ size += sizeof(void *); -+ - #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG - if (flags & SLAB_STORE_USER) - /* -@@ -3579,6 +3681,10 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, slab_flags_t flags) - #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED - s->random = get_random_long(); - #endif -+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY -+ s->random_active = get_random_long(); -+ s->random_inactive = get_random_long(); -+#endif - - if (need_reserve_slab_rcu && (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)) - s->reserved = sizeof(struct rcu_head); -@@ -3846,6 +3952,8 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page, - offset -= s->red_left_pad; - } - -+ check_canary(s, (void *)ptr - offset, s->random_active); -+ - /* Allow address range falling entirely within usercopy region. */ - if (offset >= s->useroffset && - offset - s->useroffset <= s->usersize && -@@ -3879,7 +3987,11 @@ static size_t __ksize(const void *object) - page = virt_to_head_page(object); - - if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) { -+#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION -+ BUG_ON(!PageCompound(page)); -+#else - WARN_ON(!PageCompound(page)); -+#endif - return PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page); - } - -@@ -4744,7 +4856,7 @@ enum slab_stat_type { - #define SO_TOTAL (1 << SL_TOTAL) - - #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG --static bool memcg_sysfs_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON); -+static bool memcg_sysfs_enabled __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON); - - static int __init setup_slub_memcg_sysfs(char *str) - { -diff --git a/mm/swap.c b/mm/swap.c -index 0f17330dd0e5..6e52cb476ef5 100644 ---- a/mm/swap.c -+++ b/mm/swap.c -@@ -92,6 +92,13 @@ static void __put_compound_page(struct page *page) - if (!PageHuge(page)) - __page_cache_release(page); - dtor = get_compound_page_dtor(page); -+ if (!PageHuge(page)) -+ BUG_ON(dtor != free_compound_page -+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE -+ && dtor != free_transhuge_page -+#endif -+ ); -+ - (*dtor)(page); - } - -diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c -index ace13bea3e50..77a1519c52b7 100644 ---- a/net/core/dev.c -+++ b/net/core/dev.c -@@ -4196,7 +4196,7 @@ int netif_rx_ni(struct sk_buff *skb) - } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(netif_rx_ni); - --static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(struct softirq_action *h) -+static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(void) - { - struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data); - -@@ -5745,7 +5745,7 @@ static int napi_poll(struct napi_struct *n, struct list_head *repoll) - return work; - } - --static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(struct softirq_action *h) -+static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(void) - { - struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data); - unsigned long time_limit = jiffies + -diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig -index f48fe6fc7e8c..d78c52835c08 100644 ---- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig -+++ b/net/ipv4/Kconfig -@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ config IP_PIMSM_V2 - - config SYN_COOKIES - bool "IP: TCP syncookie support" -+ default y - ---help--- - Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN - flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote -diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c -index 9917f928d0fd..784e0e2fc839 100644 ---- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c -+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c -@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ static int vmlinux_section_warnings = 1; - static int warn_unresolved = 0; - /* How a symbol is exported */ - static int sec_mismatch_count = 0; -+static int writable_fptr_count = 0; - static int sec_mismatch_verbose = 1; - static int sec_mismatch_fatal = 0; - /* ignore missing files */ -@@ -965,6 +966,7 @@ enum mismatch { - ANY_EXIT_TO_ANY_INIT, - EXPORT_TO_INIT_EXIT, - EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT, -+ DATA_TO_TEXT - }; - - /** -@@ -1091,6 +1093,12 @@ static const struct sectioncheck sectioncheck[] = { - .good_tosec = {ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS , NULL}, - .mismatch = EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT, - .handler = extable_mismatch_handler, -+}, -+/* Do not reference code from writable data */ -+{ -+ .fromsec = { DATA_SECTIONS, NULL }, -+ .bad_tosec = { ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS, NULL }, -+ .mismatch = DATA_TO_TEXT - } - }; - -@@ -1240,10 +1248,10 @@ static Elf_Sym *find_elf_symbol(struct elf_info *elf, Elf64_Sword addr, - continue; - if (ELF_ST_TYPE(sym->st_info) == STT_SECTION) - continue; -- if (sym->st_value == addr) -- return sym; - /* Find a symbol nearby - addr are maybe negative */ - d = sym->st_value - addr; -+ if (d == 0) -+ return sym; - if (d < 0) - d = addr - sym->st_value; - if (d < distance) { -@@ -1402,7 +1410,11 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, - char *prl_from; - char *prl_to; - -- sec_mismatch_count++; -+ if (mismatch->mismatch == DATA_TO_TEXT) -+ writable_fptr_count++; -+ else -+ sec_mismatch_count++; -+ - if (!sec_mismatch_verbose) - return; - -@@ -1526,6 +1538,14 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname, - fatal("There's a special handler for this mismatch type, " - "we should never get here."); - break; -+ case DATA_TO_TEXT: -+#if 0 -+ fprintf(stderr, -+ "The %s %s:%s references\n" -+ "the %s %s:%s%s\n", -+ from, fromsec, fromsym, to, tosec, tosym, to_p); -+#endif -+ break; - } - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - } -@@ -2539,6 +2559,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) - } - } - free(buf.p); -+ if (writable_fptr_count) { -+ if (!sec_mismatch_verbose) { -+ warn("modpost: Found %d writable function pointer(s).\n" -+ "To see full details build your kernel with:\n" -+ "'make CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y'\n", -+ writable_fptr_count); -+ } -+ } - - return err; - } -diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig -index c4302067a3ad..1b1e9368cae5 100644 ---- a/security/Kconfig -+++ b/security/Kconfig -@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ source security/keys/Kconfig - - config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT - bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" -- default n -+ default y - help - This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel - syslog via dmesg(8). -@@ -18,10 +18,21 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT - - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. - -+config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT -+ bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events" -+ depends on PERF_EVENTS -+ default y -+ help -+ If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl -+ will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the -+ perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is -+ changed. -+ - config SECURITY - bool "Enable different security models" - depends on SYSFS - depends on MULTIUSER -+ default y - help - This allows you to choose different security modules to be - configured into your kernel. -@@ -48,6 +59,7 @@ config SECURITYFS - config SECURITY_NETWORK - bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" - depends on SECURITY -+ default y - help - This enables the socket and networking security hooks. - If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to -@@ -155,6 +167,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY - depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR - select BUG - imply STRICT_DEVMEM -+ default y - help - This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when - copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and -@@ -167,7 +180,6 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY - config HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK - bool "Allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size" - depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY -- default y - help - This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists - to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of -@@ -192,10 +204,36 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN - config FORTIFY_SOURCE - bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows" - depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE -+ default y - help - Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions - where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes. - -+config FORTIFY_SOURCE_STRICT_STRING -+ bool "Harden common functions against buffer overflows" -+ depends on FORTIFY_SOURCE -+ depends on EXPERT -+ help -+ Perform stricter overflow checks catching overflows within objects -+ for common C string functions rather than only between objects. -+ -+ This is not yet intended for production use, only bug finding. -+ -+config PAGE_SANITIZE -+ bool "Sanitize pages" -+ default y -+ help -+ Zero fill page allocations on free, reducing the lifetime of -+ sensitive data and helping to mitigate use-after-free bugs. -+ -+config PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY -+ bool "Verify sanitized pages" -+ depends on PAGE_SANITIZE -+ default y -+ help -+ Verify that newly allocated pages are zeroed to detect -+ write-after-free bugs. -+ - config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER - bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary" - help -diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig -index 8af7a690eb40..6539694b0fd3 100644 ---- a/security/selinux/Kconfig -+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig -@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX - bool "NSA SELinux Support" - depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET - select NETWORK_SECMARK -- default n -+ default y - help - This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux). - You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem. -@@ -79,23 +79,3 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS - This option collects access vector cache statistics to - /selinux/avc/cache_stats, which may be monitored via - tools such as avcstat. -- --config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE -- int "NSA SELinux checkreqprot default value" -- depends on SECURITY_SELINUX -- range 0 1 -- default 0 -- help -- This option sets the default value for the 'checkreqprot' flag -- that determines whether SELinux checks the protection requested -- by the application or the protection that will be applied by the -- kernel (including any implied execute for read-implies-exec) for -- mmap and mprotect calls. If this option is set to 0 (zero), -- SELinux will default to checking the protection that will be applied -- by the kernel. If this option is set to 1 (one), SELinux will -- default to checking the protection requested by the application. -- The checkreqprot flag may be changed from the default via the -- 'checkreqprot=' boot parameter. It may also be changed at runtime -- via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy. -- -- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0. -diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h -index 3d54468ce334..ceafb908afde 100644 ---- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h -+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h -@@ -154,6 +154,6 @@ struct bpf_security_struct { - u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/ - }; - --extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot; -+extern const unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot; - - #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ -diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c -index 00eed842c491..8f7b8d7e6f91 100644 ---- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c -+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c -@@ -41,16 +41,7 @@ - #include "objsec.h" - #include "conditional.h" - --unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; -- --static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) --{ -- unsigned long checkreqprot; -- if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) -- selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; -- return 1; --} --__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup); -+const unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot; - - static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex); - -@@ -610,10 +601,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, - return PTR_ERR(page); - - length = -EINVAL; -- if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1) -+ if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1 || new_value) - goto out; - -- selinux_checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0; - length = count; - out: - kfree(page); -diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig -index 96b27405558a..485c1b85c325 100644 ---- a/security/yama/Kconfig -+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - config SECURITY_YAMA - bool "Yama support" - depends on SECURITY -- default n -+ default y - help - This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional - system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-copperhead-lts.nix b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-copperhead-lts.nix deleted file mode 100644 index 366cfd39e4af..000000000000 --- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-copperhead-lts.nix +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -{ stdenv, buildPackages, fetchFromGitHub, perl, buildLinux, ... } @ args: - -with stdenv.lib; - -let - version = "4.14.44"; - revision = "a"; - sha256 = "1alvhpwy9xzppwsag7qh1lkk3l4piyh2fv27w37il6gclja4dxkf"; - - # modVersion needs to be x.y.z, will automatically add .0 if needed - modVersion = concatStrings (intersperse "." (take 3 (splitString "." "${version}.0"))); - - # branchVersion needs to be x.y - branchVersion = concatStrings (intersperse "." (take 2 (splitString "." version))); - - modDirVersion = "${modVersion}-hardened"; -in -buildLinux (args // { - inherit modDirVersion; - - version = "${version}-${revision}"; - extraMeta.branch = "${branchVersion}"; - - src = fetchFromGitHub { - inherit sha256; - owner = "copperhead"; - repo = "linux-hardened"; - rev = "${version}.${revision}"; - }; -} // (args.argsOverride or {})) diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/patches.nix b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/patches.nix index 143671428c41..d54e0153229d 100644 --- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/patches.nix +++ b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/patches.nix @@ -28,16 +28,6 @@ rec { patch = ./tag-hardened.patch; }; - copperhead_4_14 = rec { - name = "copperhead-4.14"; - patch = ./copperhead-4-14.patch; - }; - - copperhead_4_16 = rec { - name = "copperhead-4.16"; - patch = ./copperhead-4-16.patch; - }; - # https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197591#c6 iwlwifi_mvm_support_version_7_scan_req_umac_fw_command = rec { name = "iwlwifi_mvm_support_version_7_scan_req_umac_fw_command"; diff --git a/pkgs/top-level/all-packages.nix b/pkgs/top-level/all-packages.nix index e09e89b0b90e..b4ad53040523 100644 --- a/pkgs/top-level/all-packages.nix +++ b/pkgs/top-level/all-packages.nix @@ -13924,14 +13924,6 @@ with pkgs; ]; }; - linux_copperhead_lts = (linux_4_14.override { - kernelPatches = linux_4_14.kernelPatches ++ [ - kernelPatches.copperhead_4_14 - kernelPatches.tag_hardened - ]; - modDirVersionArg = linux_4_14.modDirVersion + "-hardened"; - }); - # linux mptcp is based on the 4.4 kernel linux_mptcp = callPackage ../os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-mptcp.nix { kernelPatches = @@ -14273,8 +14265,6 @@ with pkgs; linuxPackages_latest_xen_dom0_hardened = recurseIntoAttrs (hardenedLinuxPackagesFor (pkgs.linux_latest.override { features.xen_dom0=true; })); - linuxPackages_copperhead_lts = recurseIntoAttrs (hardenedLinuxPackagesFor pkgs.linux_copperhead_lts); - # Samus kernels linuxPackages_samus_4_12 = recurseIntoAttrs (linuxPackagesFor pkgs.linux_samus_4_12); linuxPackages_samus_latest = linuxPackages_samus_4_12; -- cgit 1.4.1 From be7730621577722d6dd9718d69627b6c1f222da3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Markus Kowalewski Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018 22:14:32 +0200 Subject: i2c-tools: update homepage --- pkgs/os-specific/linux/i2c-tools/default.nix | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'pkgs/os-specific/linux') diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/i2c-tools/default.nix b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/i2c-tools/default.nix index eacac156c975..3f90b91f10d8 100644 --- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/i2c-tools/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/i2c-tools/default.nix @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { meta = with stdenv.lib; { description = "Set of I2C tools for Linux"; - homepage = http://www.lm-sensors.org/wiki/I2CTools; + homepage = https://i2c.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/I2C_Tools; license = licenses.gpl2; maintainers = [ maintainers.dezgeg ]; platforms = platforms.linux; -- cgit 1.4.1 From 91b570203be39ad54760b5cb43f45e4ba794d5bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Markus Kowalewski Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018 22:35:09 +0200 Subject: pmount: update homepage --- pkgs/os-specific/linux/pmount/default.nix | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'pkgs/os-specific/linux') diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/pmount/default.nix b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/pmount/default.nix index f0f706157ed1..cd0e277b2c6b 100644 --- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/pmount/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/pmount/default.nix @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec { doCheck = false; # fails 1 out of 1 tests with "Error: could not open fstab-type file: No such file or directory" meta = { - homepage = http://pmount.alioth.debian.org/; + homepage = https://bazaar.launchpad.net/~fourmond/pmount/main/files; description = "Mount removable devices as normal user"; license = stdenv.lib.licenses.gpl2; platforms = stdenv.lib.platforms.linux; -- cgit 1.4.1