From ea4f37162767280bbed460dc7293b6738cb43bd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joachim Fasting Date: Wed, 26 Dec 2018 22:24:04 +0100 Subject: nixos/security/misc: expose SMT control option For the hardened profile disable symmetric multi threading. There seems to be no *proven* method of exploiting cache sharing between threads on the same CPU core, so this may be considered quite paranoid, considering the perf cost. SMT can be controlled at runtime, however. This is in keeping with OpenBSD defaults. TODO: since SMT is left to be controlled at runtime, changing the option definition should take effect on system activation. Write to /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control --- nixos/modules/profiles/hardened.nix | 2 ++ nixos/modules/security/misc.nix | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+) (limited to 'nixos') diff --git a/nixos/modules/profiles/hardened.nix b/nixos/modules/profiles/hardened.nix index 53aa4bae2624..a588943fe710 100644 --- a/nixos/modules/profiles/hardened.nix +++ b/nixos/modules/profiles/hardened.nix @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ with lib; security.protectKernelImage = mkDefault true; + security.allowSimultaneousMultithreading = mkDefault false; + security.virtualization.flushL1DataCache = mkDefault "always"; security.apparmor.enable = mkDefault true; diff --git a/nixos/modules/security/misc.nix b/nixos/modules/security/misc.nix index 735362729bfd..4506a67487d4 100644 --- a/nixos/modules/security/misc.nix +++ b/nixos/modules/security/misc.nix @@ -31,12 +31,38 @@ with lib; ''; }; + security.allowSimultaneousMultithreading = mkOption { + type = types.bool; + default = true; + description = '' + Whether to allow SMT/hyperthreading. Disabling SMT means that only + physical CPU cores will be usable at runtime, potentially at + significant performance cost. + + + + The primary motivation for disabling SMT is to mitigate the risk of + leaking data between threads running on the same CPU core (due to + e.g., shared caches). This attack vector is unproven. + + + + Disabling SMT is a supplement to the L1 data cache flushing mitigation + (see ) + versus malicious VM guests (SMT could "bring back" previously flushed + data). + + + ''; + }; + security.virtualization.flushL1DataCache = mkOption { type = types.nullOr (types.enum [ "never" "cond" "always" ]); default = null; description = '' Whether the hypervisor should flush the L1 data cache before entering guests. + See also . @@ -88,6 +114,10 @@ with lib; boot.kernel.sysctl."kernel.kexec_load_disabled" = mkDefault true; }) + (mkIf (!config.security.allowSimultaneousMultithreading) { + boot.kernelParams = [ "nosmt" ]; + }) + (mkIf (config.security.virtualization.flushL1DataCache != null) { boot.kernelParams = [ "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=${config.security.virtualization.flushL1DataCache}" ]; }) -- cgit 1.4.1